



# ***Daily Report***

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## **Sub-Saharan Africa**

FBIS-AFR-93-225  
Wednesday  
24 November 1993

# Daily Report

## Sub-Saharan Africa

FBIS-*AFR*-93-225

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## Equatorial Guinea

### Partial Results Show President's Party Leads

AB2311223693 Libreville Africa No. 1 in French 1830  
GMT 23 Nov 93

[Text] Projections made from provisional results of the 21 November legislative elections in Equatorial Guinea reportedly give 67 seats to the former sole party and 13 seats to opposition parties which agreed to participate in the polls. The projections have been made on the basis of early partial results in percentages released today by Equatorial Guinea's Ministry of Territorial Administration for 12 out of the country's 18 electoral constituencies.

### Party Receives 'Overwhelming Victory'

LD2411000293 Madrid RNE-1 Radio Network in  
Spanish 2200 GMT 23 Nov 93

[Text] In Equatorial Guinea the national electoral board has issued preliminary data from last Sunday's legislative elections. The provisional results confirm the overwhelming victory of President Obiang's party, although they do not mention the percentage of votes counted or the high rate of abstention. Obiang has not only secured the support of the voters, but has also got the observers sent by the OAU to give their approval to an electoral process criticized by the international community. The OAU representatives believe that perhaps in 10 years the political situation in this country could improve. A report on this from our special correspondent in Malabo, Jose Aguinaga:

[Aguinaga] The African observers from Gabon, Burkina Faso, and the OAU who have monitored the elections say that both the participation and the democratic quality of the process have been variable. At a meeting with the press, they did not want to be more precise and are reserving their opinions for their reports. However, neither the representatives of the opposition nor those of the diplomatic corps in Malabo have great confidence in the work of this observation team, which was formed at the last minute after the refusal to send representatives by the United Nations and the group of western nations which comprise the so-called Donors' Table.

Meanwhile, the official radio today offered a curious explanation to justify the low levels of electoral participation: It blames U.S. Ambassador John Bennett, who cast certain spells in Malabo cemetery.

### Opposition To Challenge Results

LD2311160793 Madrid RNE-1 Radio Network in  
Spanish 1300 GMT 23 Nov 93

[Text] In Equatorial Guinea, the opposition is not prepared to accept the results of last Sunday's elections and calls on the international community to totally isolate the Teodoro Obiang regime with the adoption of sanctions, should this prove necessary. Further the POC, the Equatorial Guinean Joint Opposition Platform, has just announced its intention

to challenge the elections. Our special correspondent, Jose Aguinaga, reports from Malabo:

[Aguinaga] Representatives of the eight political parties, which did not take part in the elections, say that Sunday was the Equatorial Guinean people's slap in the face to the dictatorship. In a news conference held this morning in Malabo, the POC announced that it will challenge the elections, although it knows that the Equatorial Guinean justice system is in the service of the government party.

The Equatorial Guinean opposition is standing up to the regime and is now attempting, by exerting pressure, to bring down this electoral victory, which is already being claimed, by the government party, the PDGE [Democratic Party of Equatorial Guinea]. The opposition believes that Obiang has turned into another Macias [Francisco Macias Nguema president 1968-1979] and asks the international community to suspend cooperation and to isolate the regime. Miguel Eson of the Equatorial Guinean National Alliance for the Restoration of Democracy [ANRD], a POC spokesman:

[Begin Eson recording] We invite them to maintain not only the canceling of cooperation but also economic sanctions, which could result in a total blockade of the regime. We are aware that this will also affect us but the blockade should be maintained so that the regime is weakened and this could lead to dialogue with the opposition. [end recording]

## Chad

### Transitional Council Official Comments on Priority Issues

AB2111130593 Ndjamena Radiodiffusion Nationale  
Tchadienne in French 1900 GMT 19 Nov 93

[Text] Now that the ('confusion') of the past few days has died down, the Higher Transitional Council [CST] members can begin thinking about some burning issues. What are the Council's priorities? In Secretary General Abderrahmane Haggag's view, the major issue at the moment is that of security. Here is what the CST secretary general said when he was interviewed by Doran Donayou on 19 November:

[Begin Haggag recording] In order that there might be free, fair, and democratic elections, we must absolutely have an Army, which is truly national, to ensure security on the one hand and on the other, to contribute to the smooth running of the elections. I also think that it is necessary to reorganize the central and territorial administrations by appointing competent people with integrity. This, in my view, would have the merit of restoring the authority of the state and removing doubts where elections are concerned. That is quite important. Another issue we will be dealing with is national reconciliation and peace. In order to achieve that, there must be—as we have already pointed out—global, direct, frank, and serious dialogue, which will be binding on all those concerned. I think these

issues concern everybody, because in order that there might be true stability, there must absolutely be reconciliation and peace, which should be the product of concerted actions by all Chadians.

There is also the problem of reorganizing state finances. It is true that the problem cannot be solved entirely considering its magnitude. Nevertheless, we can start by fighting against fraud, increasing earnings, and reducing certain aspects of state expenditure. In that connection, it is necessary to review the possibilities of payment of civil servants' salaries because social stability is related to the state of our finances and their reorganization. There is, therefore, the need to solve that problem. [end recording]

### Congo

#### Mediator Appeals for Calm in Baongo, Makelekele Districts

*AB2311122393 Brazzaville Radio Nationale Congolaise Network in French 1830 GMT 22 Nov 93*

[Summary From Poor Reception] "In an interview with our colleague, Antoine Gongoie, the general national mediator, Raymond Damase Ngollo, stated that the new decree issued by the president of the Republic now makes it possible for him to negotiate directly with the various parties to the current conflict. To do so, Gen. Ngollo asked all those who still love this country to help put an end to the killings, kidnappings, and massacres to enable the country to move ahead. Let us listen to Gen. Ngollo as he spoke to Antoine Gongoie."

[Begin Ngollo recording] "It is necessary to rapidly restore" law and order in the country. This is why the president of the Republic has found it necessary to make it possible for me to negotiate directly with the various parties to the current conflict. [end recording]

"Still insisting on the need to restore calm and peace in the country, Gen. Ngollo clearly requested our brothers in Baongo district to stop the shootings and patrols and to free the roads in Baongo while a new era of negotiations dawns. On the other hand, I know that people in Baongo are waiting for Kolelas to speak. He must speak. We must not stop life in Baongo and Makelekele. These two districts have suffered too much."

[Begin Ngollo recording] "We must learn to be tolerant. We must learn to be different from what we were yesterday. We must accept the difference today. That is why I am humbly requesting all those who wield some authority and all those who have people around them to see to it that these massacres and these useless kidnappings come to end and that the Congolese people return to work. We must work. The country has suffered a lot. The people of Congo must work. They must stop harming themselves.

"I therefore call on our brothers from Baongo district in particular to behave in such a way that the shootings"

may stop, and so that "our brothers from Baongo district, who are blocked up on the roads and in schools can gradually return to Baongo and that life may return to this district. Meanwhile, we will contact the leaders as well as President [idle as heard] Kolelas. Life must continue in Baongo. Baongo and Makelekele have suffered too much. They must now live like the other areas."

Meanwhile, we mediators, will get into contact with everybody. We will hold discussions with them and try to defuse this crisis so that peace can return to these areas. Peace has no price. [end recording]

#### French Foreign Minister Condemns Deportation of Journalist

*LD2311155693 Paris Radio France International in French 1230 GMT 23 Nov 93*

[Text] In Congo, General Ngollo, defense minister and mediator between the parties close to the presidency and the opposition, is trying to convince the opposition militias to put an end to their guerrilla warfare in the districts of Baongo and Makelekele in Brazzaville. He made an appeal to that effect on national television last night. Is General Ngollo likely to succeed in his undertaking? Christophe Boisbouvier gives us some relevant facts:

[Boisbouvier] Let us say that he has at least two assets. The first one is his reputation as a moderate man of consensus. He was already minister of defense under the one-party regime of Denis Sassou-Nguesso. Recently, a few months ago, he initiated a successful mediation between the authorities and the opposition: it led to the Libreville accords.

His second asset is his regional background: he was born in the Pool [Malebo], in the Brazzaville region, like Bernard Kolelas, leader of the opposition. This may facilitate a rapprochement between the two men at a time when General Ngollo has announced that he will make contact with Bernard Kolelas.

This being said, the general's mission should not be taken for granted. Despite two weeks of shelling which resulted in at least 41 casualties in the Baongo and Makelekele districts, the Bernard Kolelas partisans are not giving in. They are still holding many houses in these districts, from which they shoot at military patrols, and they are probably not ready to lay down their arms and to negotiate without significant compensation.

In particular, they are reported to demand that Bernard Kolelas, who is undoubtedly in hiding somewhere in Baongo, be allowed to come out in the open without

being bothered by the police, and be allowed to express himself publicly. On this specific point, the mediator, Raymond Damase Ngollo, may have a role to play.

[Announcer] About Congo, the French Foreign Minister Alain Juppe yesterday condemned the deportation of RFI correspondent Frederique Genot by the Congolese authorities in Brazzaville. We know that the situation is especially tense in Brazzaville, but such behavior is totally unacceptable. Mr. Juppe said in a communique outside the meeting of the European Union foreign ministers in Luxemburg.

### Gabon

#### Presidential Candidate Presents Platform

AB2311215093 Libreville Africa No. 1 in French 0730 GMT 23 Nov 93

[Text] In Gabon, the Republican Democratic Alliance candidate, (Dijob Dibun Giding), was the guest of the grand jury of the Gabonese radio and television. The former power minister in the Leon Mebiame government seized the opportunity to set out the priorities of his program.

[Begin recording] [(Dijob Dibun Giding)] We intend to facilitate access to electricity and potable water for the greatest number of people, at least at cost, and permit access to quality health for all the people through a more efficient health and drugs policy. We are also intent on providing a more efficient social protection to the handicapped, the aged, mothers and children. As far as security is concerned, we think the state should make good use of all our competent security forces. We are bent on the restoration of our cultural identity. We also think that communication should permit the emergence of a confident, dynamic, and responsible society. Finally, we advocate an open foreign policy which will be based

on the principle of safeguarding and preserving our sovereignty and national independence. [end recording]

### Rwanda

#### UN Envoy Arrives in Kigali, Outlines Objectives

EA2311175393 Kigali Radiodiffusion Nationale de la Republique Rwandaise in French 1115 GMT 23 Nov 93

[Excerpts] The UN special envoy arrived in Kigali this morning. Jacques-Roger Booh-Booh [a former foreign minister of Cameroon], who represents here in Rwanda the UN Secretary General Butrus Butrus-Ghali, speaks about his impressions of the Rwandan peace process:

[Begin recording] [Booh-Booh] [passage omitted] My objective in Rwanda falls within the framework of the mandate of the UN Security Council and in that of peace efforts deployed for a certain amount of time by Rwandan parties bound by the Arusha accord too, that is to ensure that the best conditions are achieved to allow transitional institutions to operate effectively in the shortest time possible. [passage omitted] [end recording]

Being aware of the recent massacres in Ruhengeri, Dr. Booh-Booh promised to spare no effort in establishing the administrative institutions quickly in Rwanda. We listen to Roger Booh-Booh once again:

[Begin Booh-Booh recording] I have not yet received a detailed report on this situation but I believe that in general terms [words indistinct] this is the occasion for me to pay tribute to the Rwandan people for their great self-restraint and political maturity and sense of responsibility these last few months to have the cease-fire respected in general terms and the flame of peace and reconciliation kept alive. [passage omitted] [end recording]

That was Dr. Jacques-Roger Booh-Booh, the UN secretary general's special envoy to Rwanda.

## Kenya

### President Moi Upholds Molo Security Zone Status

EA2311175793 Nairobi Kenya Broadcasting Corporation Network in English 1000 GMT 23 Nov 93

[Excerpts] His Excellency President Daniel arap Moi today urged the citizens in Molo [Rift Valley, Nakuru district] to safeguard the peace which has been realized since the area was declared a security zone recently. The president said the speed at which peace had come to the area confirmed that those who had been fanning violence were people from outside.

President Moi was speaking at various places when he made a tour of Molo division. In his tour, President Moi inspected development projects and assessed the peace which had been restored in the area. President Moi instructed the provincial administration to speed up the resettlement of the displaced people so that the citizens could embark on developing their farms. President Moi said that the security zone would continue to be upheld until all the displaced people have been resettled. [passage omitted]

President Moi told the citizens of all tribes living in Molo to shun tribalism, as it had already threatened their lives in the area. He advised them to identify with their local problems and not to allow outsiders to confuse them for political reasons. [passage omitted]

## Somalia

### Ali Mahdi, Aidid Comment on Effects of UNOSOM

EA2311203093 Omdurman Republic of Sudan Radio Network in Arabic 0430 GMT 23 Nov 93

[Interview with Ali Mahdi Mohamed, president of the Somali Democratic Republic, and Mohamed Farah Aidid, chairman of the Somali National Alliance, by unidentified announcer on the "A Report and A Comment" program; place and date not given—live or recorded]

[Text] [Announcer] The UN Security Council issued a unanimous resolution last Wednesday [17 November] in which it agreed to extend the period of the UN forces' operation in Somalia to 31 May 1994. The resolution came in the wake of the Security Council's cancellation of its Resolution No. 837 which stipulated the arrest of certain Somali leaders on charges of involvement in the events of 5 June this year in which 24 Pakistani soldiers working for the UN forces were killed.

Ladies and gentlemen, that was the report. It is an important pointer following a real crisis experienced for some time by the UN Operation in Somalia, called UNOSOM-II. However, how do Somalis and their leaders regard the UN operation in their country in

general since the entry of these forces into Somalia last December? This is the question, and we asked the two Somali leaders, General Mohamed Farah Aidid and Mr. Ali Mahdi Mohamed. What did Gen. Aidid say?

[Aidid in English, fading into Arabic translation] UNOSOM is responsible for all the current problems in the country. It has become the main obstacle to peace and reconciliation in Somalia. I think it is very harmful for UNOSOM to continue with its destructive policies and its obstruction of humanitarian relief—it does not care about it reaching the needy citizens. UNOSOM has complicated the Somali problem. It has spoiled its humanitarian task by concentrating on military operations which are destroying the country.

We want the world to know that [word indistinct] for the Somali people sufficient humanitarian aid and that until now the UNOSOM rehabilitation and reconstruction projects have not been completed. We wish to appeal to donors and donor countries to review the aspects of the expenditure of \$1.5 billion donated for the preservation of the lives of Somali children and women and not for their killing.

UNOSOM-II has denied the sons of Somalia their basic right of running the affairs of their country and announced that it will govern Somalia for two years. This declaration in itself means full usurpation of Somali independence, freedom, and sovereignty.

[Announcer] That was Gen. Aidid's opinion on the UN forces. However, the Somali leader, Ali Mahdi, who takes the opposite stance has a different opinion.

[Mahdi] The United Nations entered Somalia and managed to restore hope and life to the people. Without them there would have been no [peace] [word indistinct] in the provinces and districts. Without them life would not have been as it is now. For this reason the United Nations and its forces [words indistinct].

[Announcer] Then, Mr. Ali Mahdi, according to you there have been great changes in the Somali arena over a period of one year since the entry of the UN forces.

[Mahdi] Last year there was the shedding of blood of the Somali people and there was also an escalating crisis in Somalia. But now the Somali people have succeeded in rebuilding their lives once more. Recently, a Somali police force was established so that security might prevail in the area of Mogadishu and its environs. Security of life has been restored to Somalia.

[Announcer] This opinion is also held by the UN command. It stresses that its presence is responsible for the maintenance of security, even if in relative terms, in Somalia. It also points out that 95 percent of the Somali people support its operations.

[Aidid] Mr. Butrus-Ghali and his UNOSOM-II operation propagate rumors through their statements. They say that the Somalis will fight one another if left alone. In my view, this is an excuse for the intervention of

UNOSOM which is organizing the propaganda in order to gain international support for what they are doing. They rely on this propaganda by announcing that over 95 percent of Somalis support their actions. However, there are only a few people who support UNOSOM-II's actions. These people will be blacklisted in the history of Somalia. All these lies are being spread to justify interference in the internal affairs of Somalia and the carrying out of military operations injurious to the Somali people.

[Announcer] Gen. Mohamed Farah Aidid has always warned against the consequences of interference in the internal political affairs of Somalia. But Mr. Ali Mahdi does not see any interference by UNOSOM in the internal affairs of the country.

[Mahdi] I do not believe that the United Nations has interfered in the internal affairs of Somalia. I want to confirm that it is deplorable that after 30 years of Somali independence—an independent state—we see this problem recurring and then the civil war comes.

I say that the United Nations and its forces have not interfered in Somali affairs. They came to provide (?first aid) to the Somali people and save them from the tragedy in which they are living. For this reason, I do not believe that there has been any interference from the United Nations.

[Announcer] Yet Gen. Aidid and his faction continue to maintain that there has been interference from UNOSOM in the country's internal affairs. They cite many examples as proof. In this situation, what form will relations take between UNOSOM and the Somali people in the future? Once again it is the turn of Gen. Aidid.

[Aidid] UNOSOM-II has lost the confidence of the Somali people and it must stop with immediate effect its operations in Somalia and leave the country.

[Announcer] But would there not be a security vacuum if the international forces left the country?

[Aidid] The states of the Horn of Africa and the OAU secretary general should take the place of UNOSOM-II to help the Somali people solve their problem. The donor countries should provide humanitarian assistance and support for reconstruction and rehabilitation.

[Announcer] How does Mr. Ali Mahdi regard the view of the Somali National Alliance?

[Mahdi] This is (?connected) with Aidid's threat. It is not (?surprising) for us that he should reject this [word indistinct]—the UN Operation in Somalia. He is in the minority in Somalia, particularly as he faces 12 organizations or 12 [word indistinct] on the other side which have become fronts and have a close alliance.

He always rejects the influx of forces of [word indistinct] and their entry into Somalia to help the Somali people and help them out of the tragedy they are experiencing. He always rejects any service offered to the Somali people who are suffering from war and drought.

[Announcer] What do you say, Mr. Ali Mahdi, about the other part of Gen. Aidid's remarks that African forces, particularly from the region of the Horn of Africa, should take the place of the international forces?

[Mahdi] We welcome any initiative whether it comes from the Africans' side or from the side of friendly countries. We always welcome the peaceful role adopted by other governments regardless of whether they are African or otherwise. But we make it a condition that these initiatives should come under the UN umbrella and not outside its remit.

[Announcer] That was Mr. Ali Mahdi Muhammad. He accuses Gen. Aidid of obstructing the operations to disarm the Somali factions. How did Gen. Aidid respond to this charge?

[Aidid] We say no to disarmament at this particular time until other measures are taken to enable us to discuss our affairs in a proper manner. There must be dialogue to start with. This is not the right time to take such measures. But as a matter of principle we have signed a disarmament agreement in Addis Ababa. We signed a draft which included disarmament but this is not its time.

[Announcer] Gen. Aidid and his faction, the Somali National Alliance, seem to hold the view that the door is not completely closed in the face of UN action in Somalia. However, they say that the work of the UN should be limited to humanitarian matters and issues relating to rehabilitation and reconstruction.

Gen. Aidid holds Butrus-Ghali, the UN secretary general, responsible for UNOSOM straying from its objectives. What does Aidid want from Butrus-Ghali so that matters can be put right?

[Aidid] This is what he should do:

1. Stop his (?miserable) policies to divide the Somali tribes.
2. Take the necessary measures to cancel the unfair and unjust resolutions issued by the Security Council and to cease his efforts to arrest the leaders of the alliance and its supporters.
3. Release all the detainees who were kidnapped from their homes.
4. Stop interfering in the internal affairs of Somalia.
5. Butrus-Ghali must acknowledge the role of the Somalis in solving their problems. He should confine the UN role to humanitarian aid and rehabilitation.
6. Stop giving the Security Council and the international community misleading information about Somalia. Finally, he must stop assisting the remnants of the supporters of the deposed president, Siad Barre, who destroyed Somalia socially, politically and economically and perpetrated great crimes against Somalia.

[Announcer] Aidid holds the view that the solution lies in the concerted efforts of all the Somalis with their different factions. They should rise above their differences provided that there is no interference from any quarter. Perhaps this is the only point on which Mr. Ali Mahdi agrees with Gen. Aidid.

[Mahdi] The Somali nation has one solution for the Somali crisis. The Somali crisis has one solution, namely, that the Somali people should abandon personal ambitions. They should join hands to build a united Somalia for the future. They should spare no efforts in reconstructing their homeland. This is the only solution for which the Somalis should make concerted efforts.

[Announcer] The Somali leader Ali Mahdi confirmed what had been said earlier by the Somali leader, Gen. Mohamed Farah Aidid. They stand at opposed ends but can this single point of agreement lead to positive steps which can push the process of peace and reconciliation in Somalia? We hope so and we believe that this point of agreement is an essential point.

### Tanzania

#### Company Directors Arrested for Government Losses

*EA2411103093 Dar es Salaam Radio Tanzania Network in Swahili 1300 GMT 23 Nov 93*

[Excerpts] In Dar es Salaam, Honorable Augustine Mrema, deputy prime minister and minister of internal affairs, has ordered the immediate arrest of the directors of 13 Dar es Salaam companies which were involved in providing (?spurious) services to his ministry and thus causing the government a loss of more than 102 million shillings in the 1992-1993 financial year. The order follows an audit report made through cooperation

between the ministry's acting auditor general, outside auditors from the office, the controller and the government's auditor general, and the building engineer from the Ministry of Works. Hon. Mrema said the evaluation made by the auditors showed that the money that was provided to these companies is incompatible with the tenders which the companies offered to the Ministry of Internal Affairs.

Hon. Mrema gave the example of the (Reckon) Enterprises Company which was provided 29.2 million shillings but did work costing 7.6 million shillings only, and the (Can) Investment Company which was provided 59.3 million shillings but did work that costed 14.2 million shillings. [passage omitted]

Hon. Mrema also said seven employees of his ministry, who were involved in causing the loss of millions of shillings, have been suspended from work and that they will be arrested for interrogation and will be taken to court.

### Uganda

#### Museveni Meets With Former President

*EA2411114293 Kampala Radio Uganda Network in English 0400 GMT 24 Nov 93*

[Excerpt] The former president of Uganda, General Tito Okello Lutwa, has spoken highly of President Museveni's efforts to stabilize the country. The general, who was meeting President Museveni at State House, Entebbe, yesterday, told his host that he has returned home to stay. President Museveni welcomed the former leader from exile. During the meeting, Gen. Tito Okello Lutwa handed to President Museveni a manuscript copy of a book which he is now writing. The book is entitled "Inside the Turmoils of Uganda" and is edited by (Michael Kema) and (Julius Lugazia). [passage omitted]

### Freedom Alliance Says Progress Made in Talks

MB2311202393 Johannesburg SABC TV 1 Network in English 2000 GMT 23 Nov 93

[Text] Positive progress has been made towards meeting the Freedom Alliance's demands for self-determination, in just over 3 hours of talks with government negotiators in Cape Town this evening. That was the message from Alliance Chairman Rowan Cronje just a short while ago. He said that for the first time the Alliance had positive proposals to consider. The Alliance will give its response during a meeting with the government scheduled for Monday.

[Begin recording] [Constitutional Development Minister Roelf Meyer] I think it was constructive; there was a little bit of progress. We did discuss again at a technical level the possibilities to overcome the differences relating to the powers and functions of regions. We presented a particular proposal to the Freedom Alliance. They will consider it, and we await their response by Thursday.

[SABC reporter Conrad Burke] Are you hopeful?

[Meyer] Well, I always remain hopeful, and again this time we are seeking a solution. We are moving forward all the time, to see whether that solution can be obtained, because in the end it will be far better to have an inclusive deal, as far as the Constitution is concerned, and for that reason we will put in everything we can to obtain that. [end recording]

### 'Positive' Progress Cited

MB2311205893 Johannesburg SABA in English 1933 GMT 23 Nov 93

[by Pierre Claassen]

[Text] Cape Town Nov 23 SABA—Positive progress had been made on meeting the Freedom Alliance's demands for self determination in just over three hours of talks with government negotiators on Tuesday night. That was the view of Alliance Chairman Rowan Cronje as he left the talks and said that for the first time the organisation had positive proposals to consider. A further meeting with the government was scheduled for Monday when the Alliance would give its response and hopefully be able take the matter forward.

Minister of Constitutional Development Roelf Meyer welcomed the Alliance response and said the government proposal had identified the north-west region as the territorial focus of a four-point package aimed at getting the Alliance to endorse the negotiated multiparty Constitution and participate in elections. The government offer was in essence a clarification of Section 118 of the draft Constitution which sets out the division of original powers between central and regional government, concurrent powers and the asymmetrical options of regions to take on these powers.

Mr Cronje said the Alliance partners would meet to study the government proposals at a meeting arranged

for Thursday and Friday at Mmabatho. He credited Minister of Justice Danie Schutte for coming forward with what he called a "constructive forward step" during the talks. "It takes the same approach as ours and we will now assess it and see what adjustments and amendments need to be made." The Mmabatho meeting would formulate the Alliance response for presentation to the government on Monday.

Mr Cronje also identified Section 118 of the draft Constitution as the central issue but said the one-versus-two ballot paper issue was also raised. "It (a single ballot) places regional parties at a clear disadvantage," he said. "It is no good agreeing on a constitutional basis if in an election one is put at a disadvantage."

Taxation powers of the regions had also been discussed. It was no good for regions to have powers and duties without the funds to carry them out. On this subject, too, there had been "movement".

The main issue, however, was that the government proposal had "moved forward" to overcome the differences between Section 118 and what the Alliance wanted. The proposal of self-determination being realisable in the north-west region was "an interesting proposal".

The Alliance had also gained the impression from the government that it was not too late to make changes. Summing up, he said it was the first time the government had come forward with a concrete proposal, which was a step forward. He hoped that reaching an agreement on Section 118 could open up avenues to agreement on other issues as well.

Mr Meyer, who led the government delegation, said the proposal made to the alliance was the same as one made three weeks ago. Then it was rejected, but now the Alliance appeared to be agreeable. He wanted to make it clear that what was being offered was a package which included the Alliance's acceptance of the negotiated settlement. There was room for adjustments to the Constitution because the multiparty negotiating council would be sitting next week, but the Alliance would have to negotiate the agreement of the other parties to any changes. This could not be done piecemeal, reopening a clause-by-clause negotiation, but only by acceptance of a package.

Besides Section 118, the package included Section 121 on taxation, the boundaries of regions and individual regional constitutions. These were identified as the four critical criteria for self-determination.

The government's main proposal sought to address the self-determination needs of both Bophuthatswana and the Afrikaner Volksfront [Afrikaner National Front, AVF] in the north-west region or province. The government felt this region offered a natural solution where two partners of the Alliance, Bophuthatswana and the AVF, could be in the majority just as the Zulus, the other main partner, were in Natal/kwaZulu. "The volkstaters case, we believe, can be satisfied in the north-west region," Mr Meyer said.

"Two factors could play a positive role—the existing natural relationship between the people of the areas of the western Transvaal and Bophuthatswana, and Afrikaners being neighbours of another region where Afrikaners are in the majority, the northern Cape. "That region has a better situation than the rest of the Transvaal. We have no doubt that this proposal can satisfy crucial issues the parties in the Freedom Alliance want resolved." The point was that their needs could be naturally accommodated by achieving regional control via the ballot box in the existing regions of north-west and kwaZulu/Natal. "Then it's over to the natural political outcome as to what happens in those regions," he said. The proposal had not been cleared with principals but this would follow if there was progress.

The government team included Cape National Party leader Dr Dawie de Villiers, Minister of Manpower Leon Wessles, Minister of Local Government Dr Tertius Delport, Minister of Home Affairs Danie Schutte and Minister of Regional Affairs Andre Fourie. Mr Cronje's Alliance team included Walter Felgate of the Inkatha Freedom Party, Chief Mangosuthu Buthelezi's American adviser Mario Ambrosini, the AVF's Gen Tienie Groenewald and Ciskei's Mickey Webb.

#### **Mandela Speaks at Patriotic Front Summit 24 Nov**

*MB2411114893 Johannesburg SAPA in English 1055 GMT 24 Nov 93*

[SAPA PR wire service issued by the African National Congress: "Address to the Summit of the Patriotic Front on the 24th November 1993"]

[Text] Comrade Chairperson, Patriotic Front leaders and members of the respective delegations.

The Patriotic Front as a whole can truly be proud of the results produced in the negotiations process. Our country at last has put together through negotiations a package of instruments which enable all South Africans, black and white, to put aside the past and travel the high road to democracy.

Through the four bills including the one setting up the TEC [Transitional Executive Council], which were enacted by Parliament earlier, we have the necessary instruments to ensure that free and fair elections take place. We have made certain that the De Klerk government is not both player and referee. This was one of the first objectives contained in the declaration of the Patriotic Front adopted in Durban in 1991.

It is now up to us to use these instruments to level the playing fields, guarantee free political activity and enable the country to hold free and fair elections.

In the recent decision of the plenary meeting the constitution for the transition has taken shape. This constitution provides for a government of national unity which would govern the country for a maximum of five years. This government will be the outcome of elections to be

held on 27th April 1994. Through this means we can now say firmly that the votes of the people will enable us to remove the architects of apartheid from the seat of political power. This was another objective the Patriotic Front set for itself.

The constitution for the transition also provides that while the country is governed by a government of national unity, the constitutional assembly will sit in order to draft the final constitution of a non-racial, non-sexist democratic South Africa. This was a third and central objective of the declaration of the Patriotic Front.

In this way, the mandate we gave ourselves is being fulfilled. The negotiations process has produced an interim constitution which opens the road for South Africa to move without interruption to a true democracy in which majority rule prevails.

We have reached this point through immense effort and steadfastness of purpose. We have produced a package which all South Africans can be proud of. In the course of negotiations there has been much give and take. Whatever we have given has been done in the interests of the country and without sacrificing our principles.

I would like to pay tribute to all members of the Patriotic Front for the way in which we have worked together to register these achievements. The lesson of this co-operation should not be minimised. In the negotiations process we took on the might of the apartheid state. We produced an outcome which lays the basis for uniting our country and our people into one nation.

Whatever our problems, we must take encouragement and re-double our efforts to work together so that on April 27th we finally and completely put paid to white minority rule and launch our country on a path of peace, reconstruction and democracy.

The road ahead is not going to be easy. The forces which tried and failed to stop the negotiations process have not given up. In fact, many of them are becoming even more desperate. To handle these problems we must have confidence in ourselves. We must have confidence in the capacity of the Patriotic Front to work together as a united force. Above all, we must have confidence in the people whose servants we are.

There are formations in the extreme right—and here I include both white and black—who cannot face the test of the electorate. They, especially the white right, pose a serious threat. They know they cannot stop the change. They however do have the capacity to create all sorts of destabilisation.

We are able to deal with this threat. In the first place, we must find the correct political answers which will leave them as an isolated tiny minority. We must never allow them the capacity to grow and develop into a social force. We must be flexible and firm at the same time. We must be willing to accommodate without abandoning

our principles. We must be ready to adjust our tactics and never lose sight of our main goal.

One of the main reasons why this extreme right poses a real threat is because the De Klerk government has always recoiled from acting with firmness against them. The same is true about the way in which the De Klerk government has failed and refuses to act decisively against those who are fomenting violence.

In addition to our own strength as a people we have managed to keep the support of the international community on the side of our struggle for democracy. Despite the changes that have taken place on the international scene, we have maintained their support not only for the purposes of eliminating apartheid but also to help us in the reconstruction of our economy and society.

We now have to fix our eyes firmly on the immediate period ahead. This is from now until the elections on the 27th April 1994. The central focus of this period is the forthcoming elections. All the other parties in the elections have one thing in common. They share a common platform of being anti-ANC [African National Congress]. They want to stop a run-away victory for the ANC.

The ANC has been the architect of multi-party democracy in South Africa. And yet these parties have come to put a unique meaning to multi-party democracy. They are trying to sell the idea that it is good for the country if there is not an overwhelming majority party. They know that they are going to lose the race so they want to plead with the electorate not to give a verdict which will overwhelmingly underscore the unity of our nation. And yet, what this country needs for its transition is the un-equivocal evidence that the people as a whole are united behind the one organisation which has been the champion of unity, peace and democracy.

We are facing a no-holds barred battle. The parties ranged against the ANC are going to stop at nothing to reduce our strength. They will do everything in their power, they will use fair means and foul means, to confuse the electorate, to scare them away from the ANC and its allies. They will do all they can to drive wedges between us.

As certain as we are of victory we cannot take our people for granted. We must carry our message to every corner of our land. The elections of April 27th are going to be the most highly developed form of mass action in which our people participate.

The constitution for the transition provides for strong central government and strong provincial government. One of the greatest dangers we face is that we may focus our minds on capturing central power and by default leave provincial power in other hands. This would be a terrible mistake. It would weaken the centre and leave it cut off from the masses. In terms of the constitution good governance, the delivery of socio-economic upliftment will depend and be perceived by people to depend on their interaction with provincial government.

Our aim must therefore be to win power at the centre, to win power in all nine provinces and to provide the forces who will establish effective local government. In deploying ourselves we must never lose sight of all three tiers of government. None of these can be left to accident or chance.

I am confident that we will be able to reach the people and convince them to support us. I am convinced that whatever tricks the National Party has in store we can out-manoeuvre them. From our foundation in 1912 we have learnt one cardinal lesson in mobilising support: never mislead the people. Speak to them with honesty and with clarity. Understand their concerns and find ways to address these. That is the road to victory.

#### **Mandela Reportedly in Good Health; Hearing 'Weakened'**

*MB2411095693 Johannesburg RAPPORT in Afrikaans 21 Nov 93 p 5*

[Unattributed report]

[Text] At first glance ANC president, Mr. Nelson Mandela, is the epitome of health and vitality—despite his 75 years. However, at the historic ratification of World Trade Center agreements this past week, newspaper photographs revealed for the first time that he wears a hearing aid in at least one ear.

ANC spokesman Carl Niehaus said upon request: "Yes, acting on medical advice Mr. Mandela does wear a hearing aid in each ear. His hearing has weakened over the past months—a situation worsened by the fact that he often has to fly to his destinations," Mr. Niehaus says, however, that the problem is a fairly minor one. "It does not affect his working ability and he often appears in public without the hearing aid."

RAPPORT believes that Mr. Mandela's health is much better now than a year ago. On 18 November, for example, he walked out of the World Trade Center at four and by 7.30 AM he was already at the Rand Airport where he flew to northern Natal for a series of public meetings.

#### **ANC 'Not Happy' With Decision on Sisulu Case**

*MB2411075993 Johannesburg SAPA in English 2143 GMT 23 Nov 93*

[Text] Johannesburg Nov 23 SAPA—The African National Congress [ANC] said late on Tuesday it was "obviously not happy" with the Witwatersrand attorney-general's decision not to press ahead with criminal charges in the matter involving the death of ANC Deputy President Walter Sisulu's bodyguard. "Although we have not seen the full text of the attorney-general's statement we are obviously not happy with the decision," said spokesman Ronnie Mamoepa. "But we shall

nonetheless press ahead with civil claims against the policemen involved and will also look into a private prosecution."

According to a statement from the office of Attorney-General Klaus von Lieres und Wilkau, the judge president had agreed to appoint a judge to chair the inquest into Ismael Maloane's death.

The statement said Mr Maloane died when the car in which he was travelling went out of control after a chase and shoot-out with police on the Soweto highway outside Johannesburg early on the morning of July 18.

Claims were later made by the ANC that the shoot-out had been an attempt on Mr Sisulu's life.

The judge president decided the inquest would start on January 24 in the Rand Supreme Court.

### Winnie Mandela Ranks Fifth in ANC Survey

MB2311122893 Johannesburg *THE STAR* in English  
23 Nov 93 p 1

[Report by Kaizer Nyatumba, political correspondent]

[Text] Winnie Mandela is one of the most popular ANC [African National Congress] leaders and will most likely be a member of Parliament next year, according to an internal top-level secret ANC survey.

A southern Transvaal leader of the South African National Civic Organisation and ANC PWV [Pretoria, Witwatersrand, Vereeniging] regional executive committee member, Mandela came fifth in a national popularity survey of ANC leaders, according to reliable sources within the organisation.

ANC Youth League president Peter Mokaba, who will vacate his presidency of the league when he turns 35 early next year, was placed seventh in the internal national popularity survey.

The sources said Mandela, who was unceremoniously flushed out of the chairmanship of the ANC PWV Women's League about 18 months ago, came second to charismatic ANC PWV regional chairman Tokyo Sexwale in the organisation's biggest and most populous region.

Mokaba reportedly came third in the northern Transvaal, where he was born.

Natal Midlands regional chairman Harry Gwala and western Cape regional secretary Tony Yengeni also did very well in the survey among ANC rank-and-file members.

The sources said the findings of the survey came as such a surprise to some people at ANC headquarters that the organisation ordered that the results of the survey be classified as top secret.

### Azapo Opposes ANC Parliament Nominations

MB2411075793 Johannesburg *SAPA* in English 0705  
GMT 24 Nov 93

[Text] Cape Town Nov 24 SAPA—The Azanian People's Organisation [Azapo] has condemned the African National Congress for nominating non-members to stand for Parliament. SABC [South African Broadcasting Corporation] radio news reported on Wednesday.

Reacting to the nomination of people such as former Springbok Rugby Captain Morne du Plessis and long distance runner Elana Meyer, the organisation said it hoped this was not an indication of things to come by filling Parliament with individuals who had not contributed towards the struggle for the liberation of oppressed people.

Azapo said it was sad when the time had come to reap the fruits of hard labour, the ANC had thought of people who had enjoyed the fruits of apartheid for most of their lives.

### No Candidates for Election

MB2311154493 Johannesburg *SAPA* in English 1358  
GMT 23 Nov 93

[Text] Johannesburg Nov 24 SAPA—The Azanian Peoples Organisation [Azapo] said on Tuesday it would take part in the democratic process leading up to the April 27 election, but would not field candidates. Azapo President Itumeleng Mosala told a Johannesburg news conference his organisation would use the process leading to the elections to put its position and views to supporters. Azapo would not field candidates for the elections because the interim constitution did not meet land and economic rights of the black majority. These issues, which should be entrenched in the constitution, were the main demands around which the liberation struggle had centred. However, Mr Mosala said the organisation had decided the democratic process was too important for Azapo to stand on the sidelines.

It believed the forthcoming elections should have been for a constituent assembly—based on one person one vote—to formulate a constitution for a democratic government. He said Azapo insisted on the transfer of power from the white minority to the black majority.

Asked whether Azapo would boycott the elections, official Lybon Mabasa said the organisation was not calling for apathy, but wanted "the people to decide what to do or not to do". Mr Mosala said: "Our people have the ultimate right to decide....Ours is to convince them."

Azapo said in a statement: "The agreements of the multi-sided Kempton Park fun-fair negotiations are calculated to condemn black people to a life of poverty and slavery. The negotiations have, through stealth and cunning, endorsed land theft and economic deprivation. They have also guaranteed jobs to the civil service whose duty it is to maintain the status quo."

Azapo said it would consult the African National Congress and Pan Africanist Congress on the issue of unity.

**Buthlezi Accuses Government of Limiting Party's Power**

*MB2411071893 Johannesburg Radio South Africa  
Network in English 0500 GMT 24 Nov 93*

[Text] The leader of the Inkatha Freedom Party [IFP], Dr. Mangosuthu Buthelezi, has accused the government of securing a power sharing role in the transitional government at great cost to constitutional guarantees. He told Canadian Ambassador (Mark Walsh) in Ulundi that the negotiations had been a manipulation of the worst kind. He said only two options were left to his party. These were either to take part in the elections which would lead to the dismantling of the KwaZulu Government, or to embark on the second stage of protests to force the ANC [African National Congress] and the government to hear the IFP's demands for freedom and democracy.

**National Front Leader Comments on Police Security**

*MB2411113893 Johannesburg SAPA in English 1046  
GMT 24 Nov 93*

[Text] Potchefstroom Nov 24 SAPA—There would be great problems ahead if the Transitional Executive Council [TEC] was placed in charge of the security forces. Afrikaner Volksfront [National Front—AVF] leader Gen Constand Viljoen said on Wednesday.

He was addressing a crisis meeting in Potchefstroom after a local farmer, Mr Johan Kooij, was murdered on his farm earlier this week.

A number of the 150 farmers who attended the meeting expressed their dissatisfaction with the lax security provided by police in rural areas. Gen Viljoen advised them to tighten their security measures, adding it would give farmers courage if their attackers' heads rolled when they struck farmsteads.

Gen Viljoen said he had discussed Mr Kooij's murder with African National Congress [ANC] President Nelson Mandela on Tuesday night and had told him that Afrikaners' state of mind was becoming "explosive". Such attacks would make Afrikaners more resolute not to enter a unitary state. There were jeers from the crowd when Gen Viljoen said Mr Mandela had asked him to convey his condolences to the meeting on Wednesday.

Gen Viljoen said he failed to understand how the TEC, consisting of unelected office bearers, could be placed in control of the security forces.

He added that the ANC and the SA [South African] Communist Party would win next year's elections and would then implement socialist economic reforms and institute repressive measures.

He said the agreements the government had reached with the ANC were not worth anything. The only thing that counted was political and military power. The real solution to the problem of farm attacks would be constitutional, said the general. He added he had told Mr

Mandela that the constitutional dispensation should ensure the ANC and the Afrikaner were kept apart so that they would not fight each other. "Afrikaners want to live in peace with blacks but in terms of AVF-policy," Gen Viljoen said.

He was negotiating with the ANC because it would be the future government. Mr Willie L. wies, of the Transvaal Agricultural Union [TAU], told the meeting farmers should not allow policemen who belonged to the Police and Prisons Civil Rights Union on their farms. He said the TAU demanded only white policemen enter farming areas. "Make your region a 'no-go area' for those who are not with us," Mr Lewies said.

**Rights Commission Reports 'Dramatic Improvement'**

*MB1311094393 Johannesburg SAPA in English 0809  
GMT 13 Nov 93*

[News release issued by the Human Rights Commission on 13 November on the SAPA PR Wire Service: "A Success Story Within the PWV Violence"]

[Text] The re-ignition of major violence in the east Rand sub-region of the PWV [Pretoria, Witwatersrand, Vereeniging] since July, has tended to obscure the remarkable degree of calm that has descended upon all other sub-regions of the PWV, some of them with a history of high levels of political violence.

The following table illustrates the dramatic improvement that has taken place in the PWV region if one discounts the east Rand.

Sub-Region	Deaths in 1992	Deaths in 1993 (10 months)
Soweto	427	79
Vaal	379	140
Alexandra	229	24
Johannesburg	101	48
West Rand	25	26
Pretoria	18	10
Total	1179	327

It must be added that a considerable proportion of the deaths that did occur in these sub-regions during 1993 were attributable, not to community conflict, but rather to such sources as taxi conflict, mysterious train and drive-by attacks, attacks on security force members and some killings by the security forces.

The graph below of deaths in the PWV region during 1993 so far, shows how the conflagration in the east Rand sub-region has swamped the otherwise favourable picture that has emerged. Apart from a minor surge in April (the month of the assassination of Chris Hani) sub-regions other than the east Rand have been surprisingly stable (even the Vaal, where only 7 deaths have been recorded in the last 2-month period).

## Deaths in the PWV Region

January to October 1993

	Jan	Feb	Mar	Apr	May	Jun	Jul	Aug	Sep	Oct
East Rand	38	15	19	30	99	55	299	310	239	214
Other PWV	19	24	17	54	35	36	44	45	33	24
Total	57	39	36	84	134	91	343	355	272	238

East Rand Deaths:1318;Other PWV Deaths:331;total deaths:1649

The HRC [Human Rights Commission] believes that this unsung success story is attributable in large measure to peace initiatives by the hostel residents and township residents themselves; to improved policing methods and attitudes which through consultation with these communities have acquired some legitimacy and respect; to the very considerable peace-promoting efforts of the Wits-Vaal regional and local peace committees; and to the ongoing presence and concern of the international observer missions.

The question remains as to why the outstanding success in all of these sub-regions cannot be repeated in the violence-torn sub-region of the east Rand where currently 90 percent of PWV deaths are occurring; and more specifically in the Katlehong/Thokoza area where during October 82 percent of east Rand deaths were recorded.

The HRC believes that precisely the same initiatives which have brought relative peace and harmony to the residents of Soweto, Alexandra and even the Vaal, are capable of doing the same in the townships of the east Rand.

## South African Press Review for 24 Nov

MB2411132893

[Editorial Report]

## THE STAR

Government, ANC Woo Freedom Alliance—A page 18 editorial in Johannesburg THE STAR in English on 24 November refers to the "wooing of the Freedom Alliance [FA]," saying: "At face value the positions of the two key FA actors, the Inkatha Freedom Party and the Conservative Party/Afrikaner Volksfront [National Front], seem immovable." But at the same time "an elaborate mating dance is taking place. This week an offer of increased 'self-determination' for Afrikaners in a new North West province was coyly unveiled by the Government. Shrouded in euphemism, its import was nevertheless clear—President de Klerk is looking for a formula that will allow the white right wing to rejoin the transition process without losing face. Simultaneously, feelers are being put out constantly to the unhappy chief in Ulundi." THE STAR does not believe African National Congress, ANC, "talk of tanks rolling into homelands" helps, and urges Mr. Mandela to "curb it."

## BUSINESS DAY

Dilemmas in Administration of Justice—Johannesburg BUSINESS DAY in English on 24 November in a page 8 editorial believes the withdrawal of charges against three of the seven people accused of murdering U.S. student Amy Biehl, in Gugulethu three months ago, after a witness said he feared for his life if he gave evidence against them, "raises serious problems and dilemmas regarding the administration of justice in South Africa." It would seem the prosecution in the Biehl case "erred" by not seeking the judge's approval "that the witness's identity be protected when he gives evidence." "Ideally, justice demands that an accused be permitted to confront his accuser face to face," but this is "hardly an ideal situation. The cause of justice will, in this and similar cases in future, suffer even more if witnesses are too frightened to give evidence and if this leads to murderers and other criminals getting off scot-free."

## SOWETAN

Government Burdened With Homelands 'Albatross'— "The National Party may claim to have rid itself of the albatross of apartheid but truth is that it has not," begins a page 10 editorial in Johannesburg SOWETAN in English on 24 November. The "so-called independent homelands" are "still hanging around its neck." President de Klerk "tried to side-step the problem by saying that these cannot be forced to return to the fold. He rejected the idea of sending in the troops to force Bophuthatswana back if they rejected reincorporation." Ironically, when the army of Bophuthatswana's Mangope turned against him, the South African Government "sent in its troops to prop him up." This same government is now saying "it cannot impose its will on the 'independent' homelands."

## \* PAC: Strengths, Weaknesses, Election Prospects

## \* PAC Revival

94AF0018A Johannesburg WORK IN PROGRESS in English Sep 93 pp 13-15

[Article by John Battersby: "Running With the PAC (Pan-Africanist Congress)"; first three paragraphs are WORK IN PROGRESS introduction]

[Text] Four years after the Pan-Africanist Congress [PAC] rejected negotiations as the solution to ending white rule, the organisation has become a mainstream component of multi-party talks and has established itself as a significant political force.

It appears to stand a reasonable chance of winning the 5 percent of votes necessary to be included in the Transitional Government of National Unity (TGNU)—and could emerge as the third largest party with more than 10 percent of the vote.

For an organisation that was almost forgotten inside the country before its unbanning in February 1990, the PAC has staged a remarkable political comeback.

The PAC's revival becomes all the more surprising if one considers the organisation's record of inept strategic decision-making and its weak political structures and organisational ability.

Since the resignation of deputy president Dikgang Moseneke in December 1992, it has also been suffering from a leadership vacuum (see box) and divisions and infighting between its pro-negotiations and anti-negotiation wings.

It is true, the PAC has also had a lot of luck.

It has benefitted from the painstaking preparatory work of the ANC [African National Congress] which led to its unbanning in 1990. The release of political prisoners and automatic indemnity for its exile leadership was something the PAC could not claim much credit for.

Since the pass law campaign in 1960, through the student uprising in 1976 and grassroots disillusionment with ANC leaders over negotiations at present, the PAC leadership has repeatedly failed to translate popular sentiment into political support—let alone card-carrying members.

But the PAC could succeed in boosting its appeal by exploiting the emotive subject of land, which is likely to move onto the centre of the political stage shortly after the TGNU is established.

The three million victims of forced removals form a formidable pool of potential PAC voters if an ANC-led TGNU fails to deliver, symbolically, by returning land to deprived communities and, materially, by making more land available to the majority.

But there is another area where the PAC is challenging the ANC and winning—and that is in the rise of vengeance.

The sight of Paso [Pan-Africanist Students Organization] members chanting "one settler, one bullet" outside the courtroom where the alleged killers of an American exchange student were making their first court appearance, sent a chill down the spine of many of those committed to non-racialism.

The PAC definitely has a fundamentalist appeal for radical youth who still hanker after the ANC rhetoric of the 1980's: render the townships ungovernable and seize power.

When 42 people were massacred in Boipatong in June last year after the breakdown of Codesa [Convention for a Democratic South Africa], PAC T-shirts and slogans were already familiar in the Vaal townships and grassroots sentiment was moving closer to the Africanist position.

Then followed the attacks by the Azanian People's Liberation Army (Apla) which represented a new level of armed activity and a willingness to strike at white victims whilst the ANC has suspended its armed struggle.

[Box, p 14]

#### Apla and Elections

Apla—increasingly a law unto itself—is actively opposed to taking part in elections, and is doing everything possible to undermine them. It will be even more opposed to the PAC taking part in a Transitional Government of National Unity (TGNU). [end box]

The PAC observation—that it took white deaths to make the government take political violence seriously—struck a chord with township dwellers which spread far wider than the traditional support base of the PAC. And it was a difficult point to argue.

The Apla attacks inspired many township youth disillusioned by the slow pace of negotiations despite a stream of concessions from ANC negotiators.

PAC leaders dealt with the white backlash by first distancing themselves from Apla's actions and gradually embracing it as the PAC liberation army, under full political control, as they realised how popular its actions were.

While there is no doubt that PAC leaders are now taking responsibility for Apla's actions, it is debatable to what extent they control them.

The assassination of SACP [South African Communist Party] general secretary Chris Hani on April 10 marked another turning-point for the PAC. Members of the ANC Youth League in the PWV [Pretoria, Witwatersand, Vereeniging Industrial Area] townships began to adopt the slogans and sentiments of the PAC.

But the PAC's greatest breakthrough came following the May 25 crackdown in which 73 of its leaders were arrested. It provoked widespread sympathy for the PAC among most of the 26 parties at the negotiating forum—and the strongest solidarity ever from the ANC.

At a Soweto rally to commemorate Hani, Clarence Makwethu appeared to draw a louder reception than Nelson Mandela. And when Mandela read out a message from the National Party, he was jeered by the youthful crowd.

### Transfer of Power

By agreeing first to multi-party talks to finalise the transition to democracy and to a transitional authority to oversee the run-up to elections for a constituent assembly, the PAC has modified significantly its decolonisation model for a transfer of power.

But the PAC leadership stood firm in refusing to take part in talks aimed at removing the obstacles to negotiations and still sticks to its two basic tenets—the return of the land to Africans and one person, one vote elections for a constituent assembly.

The PAC is a relatively young organisation if compared to the ANC, which was formed 81 years ago. Only three decades old, it cannot tap into the ANC's formidable "loyalty factor."

Five generations of Congress supporters in a family carries a momentum of its own.

If one looks at the PAC's performance since it was legalised three-and-a-half-years ago, there are ample grounds to be cynical about its chances of succeeding in the future.

Can it capitalise successfully in the future on the possible break-up of the tripartite alliance after an election and the likely waning of support for the ANC once the TGNU fails to meet the unrealistic expectations voters set?

Much will depend on development within the PAC leadership (see box), whether the organization is able to draw any foreign funding, can beef up its organisation and can project viable alternatives to meet the demand for land which is unlikely to be met by the TGNU.

But the most crucial factor determining the future fortunes of the PAC is likely to be the way the political realignment impacts on the ANC liberation alliance.

If, as some major unions like Numsa [National Union of Metalworkers of South Africa] are already suggesting, unions break with the alliance after a new constitution is drawn up and a socialist workers' party is formed, this could well upstage efforts by the PAC to benefit from the realignment.

But it is not only voices from within the ANC that are cautioning against this route. SACP strategists like Jeremy Cronin argue that it would be strategically unwise to form a workers' party to the left of the ANC.

If this counsel is followed—and the alliance holds firm—the PAC could become the core of a leftist party attracting some radical elements of the ANC, the SA National Civic Organisation (Sanco) and Cosatu [Congress of South African Trade Unions].

But the future success of the PAC will depend in a larger measure on the success of the TGNU to at least make an impact on the massive socio-economic and development needs of the country.

Unless five years of TGNU can reverse the vicious cycle of deprivation and deterioration in the urban townships, the parties who form part of the TGNU stand to lose much in the second election.

### Renewal

But the PAC will need to undergo some internal renewal if it is going to be in a position to mount a serious challenge at the second election.

There are already some indicators as to how this renewal might occur.

Since the death of Chris Hani and the subsequent occupation of the World Trade Centre by the AWB [Afrikaner Resistance Movement], there has been a grassroots reproachment in some townships—like Tembisa and others—between the ANC Youth League and the PAC in establishing self-defence structures.

These new structures at community level could revive the ailing Patriotic Front from the bottom upwards to the leadership level.

But the PAC's central dilemma—about whether to be insiders or outsiders—will remain after the election unless it is able to build up more organisational muscle to make more impact on the transition than it has on the negotiating phase.

### \* Maxwell Nemadzivhenani

94AF0018B Johannesburg WORK IN PROGRESS in English Sep 93 p 15

[Article by John Battersby: "Nemadzivhenani Steps Into the Leadership Vacuum"]

[Text]

- The rising star in the PAC [Pan-Africanist Congress] is national organiser Maxwell Nemadzivhenani, who served as the organisation's representative in Australia for nearly 10 years—and is expected to be elected second deputy president at the next PAC congress in 1994. Nemadzivhenani could breathe new life into the organisation. But he'll need to take a few basic lessons in diplomacy first.
- The PAC has still not recovered from the resignation of deputy president Dikgang Moseneke earlier this year—and many members now openly admit their disaffection with the leadership.

Moseneke played a crucial role in bringing the PAC round to negotiations in a strategically coherent way, and one that offered to strengthen the organisation. He formed a unique and solid bridge between the PAC and the ANC [African National Congress], through his personal relationship with Nelson Mandela (they were fellow-prisoners on Robben Island) and through his brother Tiego (an official in the ANC's PWV [Pretoria, Witwatersand, Vereeniging Industrial Area] region).

- First deputy president Johnson Mlambo, who was formerly commander-in-chief of Apla [Azanian People's Liberation Army], is in a strong position to succeed aging president Clarence Makwethu, who—while commanding wide respect—is fairly ineffectual as the public face of the organisation.
- A combination of Mlambo and Nemadzivhenani is probably about the most dynamic ticket the PAC could produce at present. And they would make a particularly effective team to lead the PAC into the crucial second election.

#### \* Demands, Support

94AF0018C Johannesburg WORK IN PROGRESS in English Sep 93 pp 16-18

[Article by Dr Evangelos Mantzaris: "Trying To Keep Out of Being Too Far In"; first paragraph is WORK IN PROGRESS introduction]

[Text] As the 'Year of the Great Storm' draws to a close, the PAC [Pan-Africanist Congress] is still waging war on two fronts: It has an army fighting it out in the townships, and a negotiating team fighting it out at the World Trade Centre. Evangelos Mantzaris tours the battlefield.

The PAC is, to many, still something of a closed book—an Africanist movement of a special type which simultaneously talks of armed struggle and participates in negotiations.

To the outsider, it adopts seemingly conservative ideas (calling, for example, for the dismissal of striking teachers) and utters revolutionary slogans ("one settler, one bullet").

But are there contradictions between waging armed struggle while debating constitutional negotiations at the World Trade Centre? Not to the PAC, which argues that:

- The present negotiations will not automatically lead to the transfer of power from the minority to the majority. The talks, it says, are intended to entrench white minority.
- Precisely because of this, the PAC believes armed struggle should continue until a "mutual cessation of hostilities" is declared with the government.
- Until this happens, the PAC intends to stay in negotiations with one main purpose: To point out the dangers to the other participants.

But what is the PAC demanding in multi-party talks? Like the IFP [Inkatha Freedom Party] and Cosag [Concerned South Africans Group], it has problems with the April 27 election date. But the PAC's objections are substantially different from those parties—it is not arguing against the holding of an election, but is asking what the election is for. Its demand is for a constituent assembly to be elected on April 27—as was agreed upon in the resolution adopted by the Patriotic Front Conference in Durban in 1991. Anything less than that, the PAC says, and it will not participate in the election.

But if there is a constituent assembly election, the PAC is adamant that it will fight it on the ideological political parameters of an "African socialist democracy."

The PAC has also stated that it will not accept a transitional executive council (TEC) because, it says, such a body will only have an advisory capacity. So there will be no meaningful transfer of power.

The PAC has also demanded a transitional authority in the run-up to constituent assembly elections. It sees this authority as being made up of representatives from the liberation movements and the existing government, with some international participation.

This body will take over control of the budget, electoral processes, state media and security forces during the transitional period.

#### Current Policy

The national executive and various intellectuals in the movement have articulated concrete policies which have been circulated and debated among branches and regions. Due to space limitations, only a few will be examined here.

Policies are propagated and discussed in workshops (both open and closed) and scrutinised by the movement's members before they take the form of "official policy."

- Land: The land redistribution policy is one of the movement's cornerstones (see box). In essence, the PAC believes that the imbalance in the allocation of resources can only be rectified through redistribution. People will be given access to land under a universally applicable leasehold system.
- Education: the PAC has decried mindless activism and disruption of schooling by student and teacher bodies. It is a strong advocate of the "back to school" campaign, and sees disruptions of the educational programme as detrimental to the potential of African students.

For the future, the PAC envisages a single education department, free and compulsory secondary education as well as subsidised tertiary education. PAC educationists have developed new curricula in which they have tried to relate educational developments to human resource needs.

- Health: Policy is focussed on exploring ways of developing an equitable health system which takes into account the country's social, economic and other realities. The long-term aim is a socialised and free health system, with special emphasis on rural clinics and health care centres throughout the country.

Such clinics have already been introduced by the PAC's health department in several rural and urban areas with considerable success.

Recent opinion polls have indicated that the PAC's support base has increased in the last year or so. From

0-1 percent support two years ago, the movement now enjoys from 3-10 percent support.

#### Narrow Base

Such pollsters point out, however, that its social base is likely to remain narrow, "since a non-racial position has more support among blacks."

Such an assertion is debatable for several reasons:

- Will the material conditions (political, economic, social and other factors) change significantly in the period leading up to the elections? It's quite unlikely; on the contrary, it is obvious that conditions can only worsen for the African majority.

There are no simple explanations for the increase in PAC support. On the contrary, it has to do with a combination of factors—the most important being the decline in material conditions in the townships (poverty, unemployment, escalating violence, youth disillusionment and the like) and their "electoral" repercussions.

- The compromises being made at the World Trade Centre are bound to affect an already-volatile electorate. People are likely to switch allegiance towards a movement that seems uncompromising and militant, rather than towards organisations which are forever making compromises.

#### Strengths and Weaknesses

The PAC (like any other organisation) has strengths and weaknesses.

Among its strengths: the movement's leaders (and its adversaries) cite a militant/radical discourse; the recent Apla activities (which have won it support among youth, in particular) and its strong relationship with its women's, student, worker and peasant movements.

Its weaknesses are several (and, some people claim, glaring): they include organisational disfunctions, which hamper internal consolidation of structures on the ground, and the now well publicised dwindling of the movement's funds.

Such weaknesses are bound to have serious repercussions in a pre-election period, and Benny Alexander's prediction last year that the PAC will win the first free poll hands-down amounts to nothing more than wishful thinking.

It would be dangerous to try and estimate PAC membership figures. In early 1992, a figure of 410 branches nationwide was published.

Lately, PAC leaders have claimed the movement has some 850 branches. A membership figure of 700,000 was stated recently.

The PAC's support comes from different sections of South Africa's black population. It has a very strong peasant support base in Transkei, the Western Cape and Ciskei.

Another vital constituency of the PAC is the youth—organised in structures like the Pan-Africanist Student Organisation (Paso) and the Azanian Youth Organisation (Azanyo)—and women, through the African Women's Organisation (AWO).

The PAC's support base also includes workers and sections of the African middle-class (professionals, shopkeepers, etc.) around the country.

In essence, however, the PAC can be seen as a "peasant movement" because of the strong and traditional emphasis it places on the redistribution of the land.

[Box, p 18]

#### The Armed Struggle

- Military commander Sabelo Phama and PAC leaders have repeatedly stated that even though Apla is the PAC's armed wing, it has its own organisational autonomy.
- Apla attacks have claimed the lives of over 100 police personnel in 1993, plus an unknown number of farmers.
- Phama says Apla's main motivation is that 'we cannot get to the year 2000 as an oppressed nation'. [end box]

#### Is There a Leadership Problem?

There is a perception that the PAC suffers from weak leadership.

But this is generally based on perceptions: it is true, for example, that president Clarence Makwethu does not come across as a charismatic leader on *Agenda*—but does this make him a "weak leader?"

It is common knowledge that the PAC leadership is made up of people with different social and economic backgrounds. There are lawyers sitting next to farmers and university lecturers next to Apla commanders. However, what keeps this leadership together is a belief in the Africanist ideals and collective decision-making.

The utilisation of serious young academics at certain layers of the movement's leadership (including the multi-party talks) indicates that new faces and ideas are filtering through the organisation. Young leaders such as Jackie Seroke (secretary for political affairs), Maxwell Nmadzivhenani (national organiser) and Sipho Shabalala (secretary for economic affairs) are just as competent as veterans Johnson Mlambo, Barney Desai and Clarence Makwethu.

Although there are different approaches to the future of the party and the country in general, there is general agreement on the non-negotiable principles of the organisation. The differences in tactics and strategies are basically "ironed out" in the movement's conferences and NEC [National Executive Committee] sessions.

As "the year of the great storm" unfolds, so do deliberations at the World Trade Centre. And too many of the debates taking place there say almost nothing to the majority of people—even to those who read the newspapers as seriously as they read the Bible.

Some people believe the PAC leadership has no choice but to follow the dictates of the two major players. If it doesn't, they say, the PAC will be marginalised. (Bear in mind that it was the same people who prophesied that the PAC would be marginalised if it did not join Codesa 1.)

Will the PAC follow the stream into a compromised "sufficient consensus" when it knows well that this will be suicidal for its future in terms of electoral support? It is quite unlikely—although the wise men and women who fill the PAC's seats at the World Trade Centre might have different ideas.

#### \* Land Policy

94AF0018D Johannesburg *WORK IN PROGRESS* in English Sep 93 p 17

[Unattributed article: "The PAC (Pan-Africanist Congress) and Land"]

[Text] The PAC says its land policy is based on 'socialisation' rather than nationalisation. Its objective is an equitable redistribution of resources.

- People will be given access to land under a universally-applicable leasehold system.
- A substantial amount of white-owned land has been targeted for redistribution, and the first step in this direction will be its expropriation. State land which lies idle will be redistributed to African peasants, and land expropriated under the Land Acts of 1913 and 1936 will be equally redistributed.
- A limit to the size of the reallocated land is envisaged: most of it will be in the vicinity of 300 hectares. The priority group benefitting from such a scheme will be the landless, poor and dispossessed peasants—especially those living in the bantustans.
- No compensation will be given to white farmers as their land was obtained through 'colonial settlerism' and its ownership has no legitimacy. The PAC is prepared, however, to pay compensation for development work (dams, houses, fencing, etc.). The financial compensation for such deeds will be the sole responsibility of the post-apartheid state.
- Owners of residential properties will be compensated along similar lines. The PAC would issue 'certificates of ownership' to home-owners, instead of title deeds.
- State-owned houses will be provided to those in need in three forms:

-Houses will be put on sale under a subsidised bond system.

-Long-term leases will be provided which, in time, could be converted into certificates of full ownership.

-Houses can be rented under a subsidised rent system.

Because a considerable number of poor households are headed by women, land would have to be allocated on a non-discriminatory basis.

Communal land would be allocated by local chiefs in accordance with the law of the land. All communal holdings would be converted into units held under a leasehold system.

#### \* Support Growing

94AF0018E Johannesburg *WORK IN PROGRESS* in English Sep 93 pp 19-20

[Article by Bob Mattes: "Where Did It Go?"; first paragraph is *WORK IN PROGRESS* introduction]

[Text] As frustrations rise and negotiations grow and negotiations grown more distant, common sense anticipates a surge of popular support for the PAC [Pan-Africanist Congress]. The polls, though, don't detect it...

Our political antennae sense what seem to be clear signals of increasing support for the PAC. The enthusiastic reaction at Chris Hani's memorial service when PAC president Clarence Makwethu arrived (in the middle of Nelson Mandela's address), and the PAC's ability to draw bigger crowds than the ANC [African National Congress] at recent rallies in Cape Town townships, are two of several indicators of growing PAC support.

Common sense and political intuition also suggest that the PAC should be gaining support as disillusionment increases with the ANC and its involvement in protracted negotiations. To many, the ANC's negotiations with the government seem only to yield concession after concession (for example, power-sharing until at least 1999, constitutional principles set by the Multi-party Forum which will bind the Constituent Assembly, and a federal system). Such signs lead one to expect that, electorally, the PAC should be nipping at the ANC's heels. Yet recent public opinion surveys show the PAC enjoys extremely low levels of support. For example, since the Human Sciences Research Council (HSRC) began its Omnibus surveys in February 1991, it has not found more than 2 percent support for the PAC nationally, and never more than 4 percent among blacks. Polls by Markinor, Research Surveys and the Institute for Black Research have not found more than 5 percent support for the PAC or a PAC leader among black South Africans.

And of real concern to the PAC is the fact that these levels have stayed fairly consistent, even while black frustrations grew substantially in the past year. Between May 1992 and May 1993, for example, Markinor found among urban blacks:

- The percentage who felt racial relations were poor or very poor increased from 26 percent to 49 percent.
- Those who said racial relations were getting worse increased from 26 percent to 49 percent.
- Those who were not very, or not at all confident of a

happy future for all races rose from 26 percent to 48 percent.

And, in the two years between May 1991 and May 1993, the proportion of urban blacks who felt their economic fortunes would improve in the next five years fell from 42 percent to 24 percent.

Despite this apparent wave of rising frustration, the PAC (the assumed political beneficiary of such disappointments) has failed to register any marked increase in popular support. From May 1992 to May 1993, for example, Markinor found PAC support levels among urban blacks holding steady at 4 percent to 5 percent.

The PAC's failure to make substantial ground in the opinion polls is puzzling from another perspective. Citizens often use polls in the same way as voters use by-elections: to vent steam without doing any real "damage." For example, recent polls suggesting a resurgence of Conservative Party support among whites needs to be taken with a pinch of salt; white voters might be disenchanted with the government at the moment, but would they really cast their votes to the right when push came to shove in an election? (Remember, they failed to do so in the 1992 referendum.) So one would expect at least some people who are disillusioned with the ANC, but who still plan on voting for it, to register their protest by telling a pollster they support the PAC.

Is the PAC's apparent failure to make headway actually an invention of, or an obfuscation by, the polls? One possible flaw may lie in the nature of the samples selected for most surveys. For instance, most of the polls showing PAC support under 5 percent tend to concentrate on black South Africans in urban or metropolitan townships. They may fail to uncover PAC support "hidden" in the rural areas. Yet, in a massive March-May 1993 survey among 8,300 blacks outside the metropolitan township areas normally covered by pollsters:

- Nineteen percent said they were registered members of the ANC, while only one half of one percent made the same claim for the PAC.
- An additional 38 percent said they supported or sympathised with the ANC, while just under 1 percent claimed to support or sympathise with the PAC.
- Clarence Makwethu was chosen by just 1 percent to lead SA [South Africa], as against the 63 percent who selected Nelson Mandela.

Might another problem with the polls be intimidation? Is it possible that natural PAC supporters remain silent when asked about their voting intentions? Well, a recent HSRC survey on violence and intimidation did find that fears about ballot secrecy and intimidation is a national phenomenon, but PAC supporters were not any more likely to be affected by these factors than ANC supporters (it was black supporters of the Inkatha Freedom Party, Democratic Party and National Party who seemed most likely to be affected by such concerns).

Secondly, polls which use secret ballot techniques, such as Markinor, appear to get virtually the same results as those in which questions are posed orally.

Other polls measuring "social distance" have revealed that substantially more people "feel close" to the PAC than admit they would vote for it. For example, HSRC's Omnibus surveys show that anywhere between 15 percent and 20 percent of blacks say they "feel close," or "very close" to the party. Yet this finding is probably limited by the fact that the PAC appears to share its support base with the ANC. For example, a cross-tabulation of a 1990 survey by Market Research Associates, just after the PAC and ANC's unbanning, found that 80 percent of those who felt very close to the PAC also felt very close to the ANC. However, the opposite trend was not visible—only 11 percent of those who felt very close to the ANC felt very close to the PAC.

### Strictly Limited

What this suggests is that, while the ANC may be able to woo large shares of the potential PAC "market," the portion of natural ANC voters available to be lured to the PAC appears strictly limited in absolute terms. Thus, the PAC may be forced to look to the extremes of the political spectrum if it wants to find substantially more voters, rather than hoping to peel off disenchanted layers from the centre.

This highlights one of the dangers of the extensive measurement and reporting (in articles like the one you're reading now) of support levels. Widespread perceptions that the PAC has very low levels of support may keep the PAC out of the negotiations process, and drive it to more extremist measures. This is what constitutional analyst Donald Horowitz called in 1991 a "classical coincidence of interest and behaviour."

He wrote: "The extra-parliamentary organisation with the most support [ANC] chooses a strategy of negotiation. The organisations that find themselves weak [PAC/Azapo [Azanian People's Organization]] oppose negotiation... What each organisation wants is consistent with its competitive position. As Jeremy Bentham said, 'Interest smooths the road to faith.'"

[Box, p 20]

### The Second Choice

According to some polls, the PAC appears to be much more popular if prospective voters' second choices are solicited. For instance, while Markinor found that the PAC was the first choice of only 4-5 percent between May 1992 and May 1993, the combined number of people selecting the PAC as either their first or second choice was 22 percent.

And while Clarence Makwethu was only the first choice of 4-5 percent, between 14 percent and 18 percent listed him either first or second.

In its recent survey on elections, political violence and intimidation, the HSRC found that 21 percent said they would vote for the PAC if their favoured party did not run a candidate (the highest of any party).

However, on this score the PAC faces two problems. First, it now has to contend with the SACP [South African Communist Party] in the "second choice" sweepstakes. From May 1992 to May 1993, Markinor found the SACP and Joe Slovo received under 2 percent

respectively for first choice. Yet when first and second choices were combined, the SACP shot from 11 percent in May 92 to 22 percent one year later (and Slovo went from 15 percent to 27 percent over the same period). Compared to those increases, the combined first and second choice PAC vote had actually slipped from 26 percent in May 1991 to 22 percent two years later. Secondly, it is highly unlikely that any form of preferential or transferable voting systems will be introduced in SA—so voters' first choices will be their only choices in the polling both. [end box]

## Angola

### Government, UNITA Discuss Cease-Fire

*MB2311204493 Luanda TPA Television Network in Portuguese 1930 GMT 23 Nov 93*

[Text] The government and the National Union for the Total Independence of Angola [UNITA] continued negotiations in Lusaka today, discussing the cease-fire. Our correspondent Elias Andre has further details:

The government and UNITA began direct talks here in Lusaka yesterday morning under the supervision of UN special representative Alioune Blondin Beye. Today the delegations continued to discuss the issue of cease-fire, which contains several points. Yesterday, the cease-fire [words indistinct] in two phases. In the morning, the debate included all members of the delegations, while in the afternoon, it was limited only to military chiefs. Today, the issue was examined solely by the soldiers. The government side is led by General Higinio Carneiro, while the UNITA military delegation is led by Gen. Ben-Ben [words indistinct]. All that is known is that the issue of cease-fire will continue to be discussed tomorrow [words indistinct] Resolution 8/64 of the UN Security Council, which calls for the total and unconditional withdrawal of UNITA troops from areas it is occupying militarily [words indistinct].

### Joint Military Commission Created

*MB2311194893 London BBC World Service in English 1740 GMT 23 Nov 93*

[From the "African News" program]

[Text] Representatives of the Angolan Government and the UNITA [National Union for the Total Independence of Angola] rebel movement who are holding peace talks in Lusaka are reported to have set up a joint military commission to discuss a proposed cease-fire. No details have been given about the composition of the commission, nor its exact tasks. One report said the commission had already started work. Fighting broke out again in Angola last year after UNITA refused to accept its defeat in elections monitored by the United Nations.

### UNITA Official on 'Priority' Issues

*MB2411062793 London BBC World Service in Portuguese 2030 GMT 23 Nov 93*

[From the "London Last Minute" program]

[Text] In Lusaka, the Zambian capital, the Angolan peace talks continue to focus on the issue of a cease-fire. Today, the Luanda government and the National Union for the Total Independence of Angola, UNITA, appointed a joint military commission to be led by (Craissius Karaba), a Nigerian general in the United Nations. That commission will be responsible for drawing up the terms of a cease-fire at a time when, according to observers, the two sides appear to have

reached agreement on three of the 11 points making up the agenda of the proceedings. Despite the silence imposed by Alioune Blondin Beye, UN special representative for Angola, we were able to interview UNITA Information Secretary Jorge Valentim in Lusaka this afternoon. He confirmed that a cease-fire continues to be the priority issue at this stage.

[Begin recording] [Valentim] At this stage, we are discussing a cease-fire agreement. It must be discussed within the framework of a technical commission. This issue has been under discussion for the last two days and will continue to be discussed this afternoon. Some advances have been made and we believe that (?there are no major problems) at this point. We hope that the two sides will continue to display good will and that the mediation will continue to pursue a correct line to permit open and frank dialogue.

[Unidentified reporter] What are the points over which you disagree at this stage?

[Valentim] This is no time to show where we disagree. First of all, each side has come forward with a plan. We have brought along a very comprehensive plan [words indistinct] both with regard to principles to be followed and the work which needs to be done to secure peace for Angola. The mediation has also produced a synthesis of the work done at Bicesse and Abidjan. In addition to that, the government also has its own plan. Now, discussions are under way so a general document can be drawn up that will allow us to detect points of consensus which will be (?conducive) to peace.

[Reporter] What will be the function of this joint commission which has just been created?

[Valentim] That commission will only have to deal with military and technical problems. General principals of a political nature will be discussed at plenary meetings. For our part, we think things are likely to move forward, but we must wait for the end of discussions to see [words indistinct] the plenary meeting so we can define the political principles (?hindering) a cease-fire accord. [end recording]

Nevertheless, UNITA Information Secretary Jorge Valentim has said there are no indications that guns could fall silent in Angola prior to Christmas.

[Begin recording] We cannot give dates here in Lusaka. We cannot give a date because we only began discussing the cease-fire this week. In addition to that, the delegations have the right to hold meetings with the observers. Last week, for example, we took the initiative to hold meetings with the Americans and the Portuguese. No dates have been advanced yet because we are still discussing general principles. We shall mention dates only when all else has been completed. No dates have been advanced yet. That is speculation by the media and it does not correspond to the truth. [end recording]

### **'Major' Progress Reported**

*LD2311185393 Lisbon Radio Renascenca in Portuguese to Europe 1700 GMT 23 Nov 93*

[Excerpts] We have just heard that there has apparently been major progress at the Angolan peace talks in Lusaka. [passage omitted] LUSA news agency correspondent Vitor Carvalho is on the line from Lusaka with a special report for Radio Renascenca:

[Carvalho] The Angolan Government and UNITA [National Union for the Total Independence of Angola] delegations have already reached an understanding on the question of the cease-fire. The two sides have also agreed to set up two specialized commissions—one military, the other political—to discuss and work out what concessions the Angolan Government is to make to Jonas Savimbi's organization in terms of ministerial portfolios, regional government posts in some provinces, and the future status of Jonas Savimbi. This protocol already existed in draft form when the two delegations arrived here in Lusaka, but was in jeopardy at one point because of the demands made by UNITA. It could now be implemented in practice as from 20 December following a public signing ceremony in New York.

The big question mark is whether the government delegation can commit itself to offering UNITA the post of vice president of the republic for Jonas Savimbi—that would necessitate calling off the second round of the presidential elections [that never took place due to the outbreak of fighting]—as well as posts in provincial governments. The point being that these aspects agreed here can only be put into practice after the Angolan Constitution has been revised, and yet such a revision has not yet been scheduled, nor even envisaged. [passage omitted]

### **Radio Analyzes Events**

*MB2411071593 Luanda Radio Nacional Network in Portuguese 0600 GMT 24 Nov 93*

[Excerpt] The Lusaka peace talks remain stagnant. The National Union for the Total Independence of Angola, UNITA, negotiators continue to behave in a contradictory manner and the observers are disappointed with the stands adopted by the men of the Black Cockerel. Alberto de Sousa, special Radio Angola correspondent in Lusaka, reports on the evolution of the peace talks:

[Begin de Sousa recording] The Lusaka peace talks are in neutral gear. Two days after the start of talks, everything remains the same: the government and UNITA teams have not yet been able to find much desired consensus regarding a cease-fire accord. A reliable source has revealed that the UNITA team continues to adopt contradictory stands. First, it agrees with the Bicesse Accord. Then, it disagrees. UNITA has agreed to withdraw from the areas it has occupied since its electoral defeat, but it disagrees with everything when troop withdrawal and confinement come up for discussion. The aforementioned source added that Alioune Blondin

Beye, the UN secretary general's representative in Angola, and the Angolan peace process observers are disappointed with UNITA's behavior.

It is Jonas Savimbi's UNITA movement that is complicating things. Let it be noted that this has always been UNITA's ploy to undercut all peace initiatives for Angola. The military commissions are to continue their work today in an atmosphere charged with skepticism. A rather skeptical source told Radio Angola in Lusaka yesterday, quote, we are doing nothing here, unquote. In the face of such negative behavior, the observers are wondering whether UNITA came to the Zambian capital in good faith or whether it is here only on an operation to charm the observers in a bid to forestall an international blockade and prevent the adoption of supplementary UN Security Council sanctions.

In Lusaka, there has been no mention yet of a breakdown at the talks, but as things stand anything could happen. [passage omitted] [end recording]

### **UNITA Actions Outlined**

*LD2411094493 Lisbon RDP Antena 1 Radio Network in Portuguese 2300 GMT 23 Nov 93*

[Excerpts] Soldiers to one side, politicians to the other: Such is the working procedure that will now operate at the Angolan peace talks in Lusaka. [passage omitted] Details from Walter Medeiros:

[Medeiros] One thing is undeniable: UNITA [National Union for the Total Independence of Angola] has succeeded in its endeavors to have military and political issues discussed simultaneously in Lusaka. The Black Cockerel movement will not agree to a military accord without political quid pro quos, in other words, power-sharing.

In pursuit of their aim, Savimbi's representatives are now using as an argument the fear of a rash gesture by government troops in more sensitive regions such as Kuito and Huambo. The government agrees to discuss some political points, but has already warned that any agreement thereon can only be implemented after a revision of the Constitution. Luanda agrees to the dismantling of the riot police, the exchanging of POWs, and to UNITA's access to the state-owned news media. However, it makes the offer of the vice presidency to Jonas Savimbi and of some provincial governorships to UNITA hinge on a revision of the Constitution. The government has also agreed to give UNITA several government portfolios, but makes this conditional on all UNITA members of parliament formally taking up their parliamentary seats. [passage omitted]

**Radio Questions UNITA's Jonas Savimbi's Motives***MB1911173593 Luanda Radio Nacional Network in Portuguese 1100 GMT 19 Nov 93*

[From the "Voice of the Resistance of the Black Cockrel" program: "When Will Jonas Savimbi Learn To Fulfill His Commitments?" ]

[Excerpts] It is a great pity—not to say bad luck—to have in our fatherland a man like Jonas Malheiro Savimbi. Without wincing, he destroys everything and cheats on everybody—or at least on those who still pay attention to him—as part of his insatiable urge to rise to power at any price. Savimbi is at it again, after realizing that it is difficult to fulfill his macabre plans through the armed struggle because the Angolan Armed Forces, the armed wing of the Angolan people, have proven to be more than capable of defending the fatherland. He is still day-dreaming about what the people denied him at the ballot boxes. While he wages war throughout the country, Savimbi completely disregards the election results and the Bicesse Accord.

So the war veteran now says he accepts the vice presidency of Angola and has suggested that National Union for the Total Independence of Angola [UNITA] could appoint provincial governors. In other words, party cadres would take up the administration of several provinces. As we see it, Savimbi would appoint governors for Huambo, Cuando Cubango, Bie, and Benguela, and afterward he would continue with his destructive campaign. In other words, he would seize power through war.

Whenever Savimbi is in dire straits militarily, he puts on the sheep's clothing and talks of peace. He proposes talks with the government while posing as the victim, when in reality he has always been the aggressor. [passage omitted]

Savimbi has never fulfilled and will never fulfill his undertakings. Let us not deceive ourselves: For us, Lusaka is just another meeting. Jonas never fulfilled what he pledged at previous meetings. We should not feel despondent about the situation, though we must not ignore the reality. As long as Jonas is around, peace will not return to Angola.

Despite the varied efforts made by the legitimate government of Angola, which wants the war to end once and for all and wants to see Angolans happy, Savimbi's radical organization does not seem to be in the least interested in laying down arms and singing the song of peace. The government believes that negotiations should start by dealing with a cease-fire. Savimbi's men want something quite different, although they resort to diplomatic maneuvering like their boss as taught them.

Undoubtedly, Angolans put great hope in the Bicesse Accord. Savimbi did not disturb Angolans for 17 months, but after he lost the elections he resumed the

killing. After Bicesse there was the Namibe meeting, which turned into a complete fiasco in less than a week. People had hopes about the first Addis Ababa meeting, but the second one was a failure. We then went to Abidjan, the land of old Houphouet-Boigny, but the protocol was not signed because Valentim and his cronies rejected Point No. 11. They wanted UN troops to be deployed in Angola to monitor the cease-fire. UNITA then went to the extreme of declaring a so-called unilateral cease-fire. But now UN monitors are not required, because in practice Jonas continues to order his troops to attack FAA [Angolan Armed Forces] units.

So, those are the facts. They prove that Savimbi will never fulfill his undertakings as long as he lives and is not in power. For Angolans and the peace-loving international community, it is necessary to meet the aspirations of the Angolan people who ardently desire the peace in the country. Angolans are cautious about the possibility of a happy outcome to the Lusaka meeting because they know the type of people they are negotiating with.

We call on Armed Forces for the Liberation of Angola soldiers to desert because Savimbi is merely deceiving them.

**Military Situation in Cuito 'Deteriorating'***MB2311211393 Luanda TPA Television Network in Portuguese 1930 GMT 23 Nov 93*

[Excerpt] The military situation is deteriorating in the city of Cuito. While peace talks are under way in Lusaka, Jonas Savimbi's armed men continue to carry out new actions to obtain more advantageous positions. On the other hand, foreign citizens want to leave Cuito at all cost, even if they have to go to hell. Our correspondent reports:

The political and military situation is deteriorating in the city of Cuito. Four civilians were killed and two Angolan Armed Forces soldiers were wounded in an attack by UNITA against government troops along Cuito-Cunene road. [passage omitted]

**FAA Staff Updates Attacks***MB2411073093 Luanda Radio Nacional Network in Portuguese 0600 GMT 24 Nov 93*

[Text] The National Union for the Total Independence of Angola, UNITA, may be making it difficult for the Lusaka peace talks to succeed, but that is not the only place where it is hindering efforts for the peace the Angolan people so desire. Its men continue to carry out attacks against everyone and everything in Angola. This was confirmed by a press release issued by the Angolan Armed Forces, FAA, General Staff yesterday. In it, the FAA General Staff reported that the UNITA rebels carried out 21 attacks, eight ambushes, 18 shelling, two abductions, two murders, and 15 mine-planting operations in the areas of Menongue, Gabela, Caxito, Ucuma, Balombo, Mupa, Waku Kungo, and Zenza do Itombe between 15 and 21 November.

### Savimbi on Recent Efforts To End War

BR2311133893 Milan IL GIORNALE in Italian 23 Nov 93 p 14

[Interview with UNITA leader Jonas Savimbi by Giancarlo Coccia in Huambo, date not given; first paragraph is IL GIORNALE introduction: "Angola Appeals to Italy and the Church"]

[Text] The strife in Angola is a forgotten war that is reaping a harvest of 1,500 victims a day and has killed over 1 million people in the last 18 months: young and the old, women and children, soldiers and civilians. In some places, such as Cuito, there have been cases of cannibalism. Attempts to negotiate an armistice—for the time being there can be no talk whatsoever of a peace treaty—are under way under the auspices of the United Nations in Lusaka, Zambia, between Angolan government and UNITA [National Union for the Total Independence of Angola] delegations, UNITA being the anti-Marxist rebel movement that has been fighting against the central administration since 1975. Jonas Savimbi, the leader of the rebels, who refused to acknowledge defeat in the elections held in October 1992, is now ready to listen to any proposal. A Lausanne University sociology graduate, he found himself at the head of UNITA in 1968, during the war against Portugal, then the ruling colonial power. Later, with U.S. and South African support, he fought against Cubans, Russians, and Angolans in the former Portuguese colony's "second war of liberation."

Mr. Savimbi answered IL GIORNALE's questions from his Huambo headquarters.

[Coccia] It seems that this time you will reach an agreement with the single ruling party, the Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA). UN representative Alioune Blondin has stated that "a solid foundation has been laid" for peace. Will it be peace at all costs or will we be seeing "armed" negotiations?

[Savimbi] I do not believe that we will enter negotiations with arms at the ready, but you have to understand Angola's problem. It is complex, it is complicated, and I believe that there are people who are trying to simplify it. You have to be familiar with Angola; it is 18 years since the Portuguese left, but in all that time there has been no peace. You have to be a bit better acquainted with Angola. For our part, we are ready for peace. We are always ready for peace, we have always wanted peace; all we need is the conditions for real peace, the peace of the living, not the peace of the dead. These conditions have to be created before peace can be achieved. There can be no peace imposed with the wave of a magic wand in this country.

[Coccia] Would you accept a ministry, any ministry, in a government of national unity?

[Savimbi] I believe that if we achieve peace, the way in which we organize ourselves as a government will be the

least of our worries. The problem is not how to share out the ministries. At the moment, the most difficult thing is to find peace. Once we have achieved peace, we shall establish how people can live together, how they can make their voices heard and talk to one another. Once we have found the solution, I believe the ministries can be shared out in two or three hours.

[Coccia] They say that, at this juncture, UNITA controls four-fifths of Angolan territory. Are you ready to withdraw your troops from the areas that you have conquered in exchange for a meeting with President Dos Santos' delegation?

[Savimbi] I believe that, even if we wanted to, the population and the soldiers would refuse.

[Coccia] Mr. President, who is helping you? How is it that, after a year of bitter fighting—in Huambo and Cuito, for instance—you still possess a formidable quantity of arms and you still have a lot of friends?

[Savimbi] At this juncture we can say that we have personal friends—we have no friends at state level—but our best friend is currently our own people. There is no country, in Africa or elsewhere, that is helping us, but there is now an aspect that should be appreciated: There is fighting almost everywhere, and it is becoming an expression of the people's frustration. The people have been frustrated since the fraudulent elections, and they do not hesitate to give their support; all we do is organize it. We do not lack soldiers; soldiers are flocking to us in their thousands. Since I arrived here, we have also captured tanks that the MPLA bought from Russia—I have just received the report from my commanding officers. The MPLA has mercenaries in its pay, but it is losing with mercenaries. The MPLA has bought enormous quantities of arms that pass into UNITA hands with deserting soldiers. The military aspect should therefore not carry the entire weight in the search for a solution, otherwise there will be no solution. The MPLA will never have sufficient firepower to defeat UNITA.

[Coccia] In your opinion, what made the United States change its position with regard to you? Do you think the change can be laid at the door of the oil lobbies, or is there a reversal of policy?

[Savimbi] I think that is a question for the Clinton administration to answer. We were astonished at the change in American policy; we knew that Republican policy was different from that of the Democratic administration, but we never imagined or thought that they would become our enemies, as they now appear to have done. However, I believe they are about to change very shortly.

[Coccia] We have at long last heard—and it seems that this time the witnesses are credible—that numerous UNITA partisans were executed between 31 October and 4 November 1992. The talk is of tens of thousands of men, women, and children, shot in the head. Are you aware of this? What is your reaction?

[Savimbi] I think that the story is known. There were ambassadors who reported to their governments, giving precise details regarding the massacres, the violence, and the hate as well. We may be divided politically, but what we experienced during that period, first in Luanda, then in Sumbe, Benguela, Lobito, and Lubango was hate. The massacre was organized, and it turned into a personal genocide. Even today, people and even the dead, dead leaders, are still in prison: the body of Vice-President Chitunda, the body of Salupeto Pena. We still do not know where the body of Alicerces Mango (UNITA political secretary) is; there are still people in jail, women and children, a year after the massacres. These are the aspects that I believe should be considered in the search for a solution to the Angolan problem. We are doing what many Angolans, even those on the other side, expect in their hearts. The excesses and errors must be acknowledged, and the quest for peace must begin anew, wholeheartedly. This is our movement's position.

[Coccia] Do you see a role that Italy could play in the Angolan peace process? If so, what role? Have you a message to send to Italy and the Italians?

[Savimbi] Definitely. First of all, the UNITA delegation that visited Italy (9-12 June 1993) was well received, and there was a willingness to listen to what we had to say. Secondly, peace in Mozambique was brought about by the church, led by the church in Italy. We pray to God that the peace process in Mozambique will have the best possible outcome, but in any case, the church's contribution and Italian support have been enormous and extremely positive. Italy's participation in the peace process in Angola would therefore be more than welcome, even through the good offices of the church. Why the church? The Catholic Church has achieved what the United Nations has been unable to accomplish in Angola. We think that it has people with a sincere desire to find a peaceful solution who can help mediate between the two sides. I believe that Italy has a role to play, and we hope to find the same readiness to listen the next time we visit your country as well. If men listen to one another they will find the mutual understanding needed to set out on the road to peace in Angola.

## Malawi

### National Council Seeks Help With Transition

EA1911221093 Blantyre Malawi Broadcasting Corporation Network in English 1800 GMT 19 Nov 93

[Text] The National Consultative Council [NCC] has called on the international community to help it in order to execute its activities smoothly during the transition period to Malawi's general elections next year.

Addressing a press conference after meeting the local donor community, the current NCC chairman, Mr. (Shaile Kondowe), noted that for the council to carry out its job systematically, there was need for assistance. Mr. (Kondowe) said during the meeting representatives of

the NCC informed the donor community that it was concerned with the slow progress that was being made to disarm the MYP [Malawi Young Pioneers]. He explained that the council had expected that the issue would have been discussed at the recently ended meeting of parliament. He said there were fears that should the MYP not be disarmed, there may be violence and intimidation close to the general elections.

Mr. (Kondowe) also said the meeting expressed serious concern at the slow process of returning of agricultural loans by farmers, which, he said, if the donor community could not help Malawi, it could result in a serious food shortage next year. He also called for international support to individual parties in advice and consultancy before the general elections.

## Mozambique

### People Block Traffic To Protest Bus Fare Increases

MB2411082393 Maputo Radio Mozambique Network in Portuguese 0800 GMT 24 Nov 93

[Text] Traffic has been interrupted in the city of Maputo since early this morning. This is particularly the case along those routes leading into and out of the city.

Large groups of people have set up barricades with tree branches and tires to prevent traffic. They are protesting against privately owned bus transportation cost increases. In some areas, people have threatened to set buses on fire. The Oliveiras Bus Company currently has 18 of its vehicles grounded near Jardim Ward and another four in [words indistinct] those buses should have been doing the Maputo-Gaza-Inhambane route and vice versa.

The Oliveiras Bus Company management has told Radio Mozambique that its tariffs are set to rise by between 20 and 25 percent as of 29 November.

### Prime Minister Urges Calm

MB2411115193 Maputo Radio Mozambique Network in Portuguese 1030 GMT 24 Nov 93

[Excerpt] Maputo, the capital of Mozambique, this morning awoke to unrest in several outlying areas of the city. Residents of those wards took to the streets and put up barricades to block traffic in protest against the increase of the minibus tariff to 1,000 meticals. Minibus owners justify the increase by saying that fuel prices have risen. It should be recalled that while fuel prices went up by about 30 percent on 22 November, minibus fares went up by 100 percent. Unrest was limited to several outlying wards of the city this morning, mostly those routes leading into and out of the capital, but it soon spilled over into the city center. The forces of law and order went out on the streets in an attempt to contain the

unrest. Radio Mozambique has interviewed Prime Minister Mario da Graça Machungo. Our reporter began by asking him what was the stand of the Mozambican Government on the matter.

[Begin Machungo recording] Well, the problem is as follows: the problems which have beset the city since this morning have forced us to take measures. We have had to alert the defense and security forces to take up positions to prevent acts of vandalism and disorderly behavior in the city. Reports have reached us that the agitators then moved to other parts of the city and we are now trying to identify the real sources of this unrest. Rumors doing the rounds suggest that this unrest has been caused by an increase in the price of minibus fares, which have been raised from 500 to 1,000 meticals. To my mind, the magnitude of that increase is unjustified. The fuel price increases were not determined by a unilateral act on the part of the government. The fuel price increase was determined by increased fuel prices at the source, which prompted importers to adjust the price accordingly. Nevertheless, the official fuel price increase of more than 30 percent does not justify a 100 percent increase in minibus fares. Furthermore, such an increase does not justify changes to law and order, so we have ordered the forces of law and order to take up positions to ensure that order is maintained. Should people insist on disorderly behavior, we shall have to take measures. The government is monitoring the situation very attentively. Later today, when we have obtained more information, we may be able to get in touch with the people once again. We would just like to ask the people to remain calm and not to respond to provocation. There is much provocation going on at this stage. People must remain attentive to any acts of vandalism which may lead to disorder and emotional behavior in the city. This is the message I would like to convey to the people. Above all, I would like to urge people to remain calm and go about their normal lives. The forces of law and order will remain attentive. The government will act to prevent any attempt to alter the situation in the city of Maputo. [end recording]

The unrest which erupted in the Mozambican capital this morning has resulted in acts of vandalism. Some people threw stones at vehicles and burned them. Others broke shop windows and looted some commercial establishments. We do not have an assessment of the damage yet. [passage omitted]

#### Renamo Leader Comments

MB2411121993 Maputo Radio Mozambique Network  
in Portuguese 1030 GMT 24 Nov 93

[Text] Our news desk has just received a report saying that a group of some 50 to 100 people chanted and tried to demonstrate in front of the president's office here in Maputo. They were, however, dispersed by police. This morning, Radio Mozambique also approached Afonso

Dhlakama, Mozambique National Resistance [Renamo] leader, for comment on the demonstrations currently under way in the capital.

[Begin recording] [Dhlakama] In just about every country, people tend to use other avenues when they want something from the government. When the government fails to respond, though, demonstrations tend to follow. Sometimes, people (?put up barricades) and close off roads, sometimes they even march in the direction of the presidential palace, chanting, filling the roads. I regret that such developments should take place. They have been stoning vehicles which belong to innocent people. They have been breaking shop windows and attacking vehicles belonging to people who have had nothing to do with any of this and who are also worried about these fuel price measures. Perhaps people should look for vehicles owned by the state, instead of setting alight vehicles which are privately owned.

[Unidentified reporter] Our studios have also received reports that individuals brandishing Renamo flags have surfaced in those parts of the city which have been beset by violence. Are you aware of that? What is your opinion about it?

[Dhlakama] No, we are not at all aware of that. I have seen people pass by here, I have seen children, and I have seen no one wielding a Renamo flag. It is possible that some youths may have picked up Renamo flags [words indistinct] the Mozambique Liberation Front itself has Renamo pamphlets, but has nothing to do with the Renamo Party. I have seen youths passing by and I have not seen any of them carrying Renamo symbols. [end recording]

#### Report on Hospital Activity

MB2411125693 Maputo Radio Mozambique Network  
in Portuguese 1030 GMT 24 Nov 93

[Report by Radio Mozambique mobile reporter Emilio Manhique]

[Text] People began putting up barricades in various parts of the city at about 0600 [0400 GMT]. The unrest began in Infulene, George Dimitrov, 25 June, and Ulene Wards, as well as Combatants' Square. Those demonstrations have since spread to the city center. Now even the museum area is affected by such behavior. In fact, it is regrettable for us to report that acts of vandalism have occurred. Shops in various parts of the city of Maputo have been completely looted. We have seen people sneak into shops to steal everything they can. Some of those people are not demonstrators. They are only taking advantage of the situation.

We have also been to Maputo Central Hospital, where there is much activity. Just about every minute sees private cars and ambulances coming in with injured people.

begin as of 30 November in 25 assembly points distributed evenly throughout the country and throughout government- and Renamo- controlled territory. This plan will be presented to the two sides for approval in the Supervision and Control Commission meeting scheduled for next week.

With the opening of all other assembly points in December, and the beginning of demobilization of troops in January, UNOMOZ has foreseen the risk of creating an impasse if the training centers for the soldiers who will be part of the new armed forces are not ready by then. A reconnaissance team—consisting of military personnel from the government, Renamo, Great Britain, Portugal, and France—that inspected those assembly points has reported that five of the seven centers need to be renovated, some to a major extent.

Meanwhile, Ajello anticipates that on 24 November the structure of the new army will be approved, as well as three other documents pertaining to the training of the new armed forces.

An issue that has come up again is that of Salamanga, where Renamo claims to have captured a government spy. Concerning this, the representative of the UN secretary general recognized that the decision made in July that Renamo should abandon the area that it occupied in violation of the Rome accord has not yet been carried out, but the issue will be discussed again, since the two sides signed an accord that should be respected.

On advisers of provincial governors to be appointed by Renamo, the UNOMOZ leader said he is aware that some of them are currently in Maringue attending a training course in preparation for the task. Lastly, Ajello commented that if the principle that in Mozambique military service should only be performed by volunteers was applied strictly, very probably the country would be like Costa Rica, a country without armed forces. This implies that the government should be thinking about ways to encourage the people to join the military force.

Liberian leader disclosed that at least two battalions from Kenya and Zimbabwe are ready, waiting to be airlifted to Liberia by the United Nations.

Dr. Sawyer then urged the chief of the UN observer team to do all within his powers to ensure the arrival of the expanded ECOMOG troops before the end of November. The interim president also solicited suggestions from Gen. Opande relating to what government can do to ensure the speedy arrival of the expanded ECOMOG troops. President Sawyer at the meeting reaffirmed the firm commitment of the interim government to the peace process.

Dr. Sawyer further reiterated the preparedness of the interim government to relinquish power as soon as the arrival and deployment of the expanded ECOMOG troops signalled the start of the disarmament process. The interim president also thanked all the non-ECOMOG African countries that have agreed to send troops to join ECOMOG in Liberia.

## Mali

### ADEMA Issues Statement, Condemns 17 Nov Incidents

*AB2211162593 Bamako Radiodiffusion-Television du Mali Radio in French 2000 GMT 21 Nov 93*

[Text] Professionals of the Alliance for Democracy in Mali (ADEMA)-African Party for Justice and Solidarity held a conference yesterday at the Amdalai Islamic Center during which they held a lengthy discussion on the current political situation of the party and the country as well as the recent events that occurred in Bamako. The participants, in a communique issued at the end of the conference, stated that the war on fraud—in all its forms—is now a fully expressed desire of the greater majority of our people. It is basically aimed at combating one of the greatest ills of our time—unemployment—and also checking the decreasing purchasing power of Malian workers through the protection of our companies and local products, in general.

The conference therefore strongly disapproves of and condemns the destroyers of public property; expresses its full support for the government, the special antifraud squad, and the security forces in their sanitization exercise—which is being carried out in strict conformity with the rule of law; reaffirms the importance the party attaches to the development of private initiative and its support for local businessmen who comply with the laws in force; and lastly, urges the Chamber of Commerce and Industry and all businessmen, who have the nation's interest at heart, to rally round the government to enable it to carry through the changes demanded by all with a view to serving the interest of Mali and all Malians. The war against defrauders, be they government officials or private businessmen, must be pursued relentlessly and with determination for the good of the country and the businessmen themselves.

## Nigeria

### Government Announces Ruling Council Membership

*AB2311135593 Dakar PANA in English 1338 GMT 23 Nov 93*

[Text] Lagos, 23 Nov (NAN/PANA)—Nigeria's military government on Tuesday announced the membership of the Provisional Ruling Council (PRC). The director of defence information, Brig.-Gen. Fred Chijuka, said Lt. Gen. Oladipo Diya was the new chief of general staff (CGS) and vice chairman of the PRC. Maj. Gen. Abdul-Salam Abubakar was named the new chief of defence staff (CDS) while Brig.-Gen. Mohamed Chris Alli becomes new chief of Army staff.

Other members are Rear Admiral Allison Madueke, who becomes the new chief of naval staff, Air Vice Marshal John Femi, the chief of air staff and Ibrahim Commassie, the inspector general of police.

Civilian members include vice presidential candidate of the defunct Social Democratic Party (SDP), Babagana Kingibe, as minister of external affairs, Alex Ibru, minister of internal affairs and Olu Onagoruwa as the new federal attorney general and minister of justice. Ismaila Gwarzo, who retained his position as the national security adviser, was also named a PRC member.

The head of state and chairman of the PRC, Gen. Sanni Abacha, remained minister of defence.

Members of the PRC would be sworn in at Dodan Barracks on Wednesday [24 November].

### More on Council's Composition

*AB2311162093 Lagos Radio Nigeria Network in English 1500 GMT 23 Nov 93*

[Text] The Provisional Ruling Council [PRC] has been constituted. The head of state and commander in chief of the Armed Forces, General Sanni Abacha is the chairman of the council. Gen. Abacha will also take charge of the Ministry of Defense. The vice chairman is Lieutenant General Oladipo Diya who was named as chief of general staff. Members include Major General Abdul-Salam Abubakar who becomes of chief defense staff; Brigadier General Mohamed Chris Alli, chief of army staff; Rear Admiral Allison Madueke, chief of naval staff; Air Vice Marshal John Femi, chief of air staff; and Alhaji Commassie is inspector general of police. Other members of the council are Ambassador Babagana Kingibe, who is named as the minister of external affairs; Mr. Alex Ibru, minister of internal affairs; Dr. Olu Onagoruwa, attorney general of the Federation and minister of justice; and Alhaji Ismaila Gwarzo, national security adviser.

The composition of the council was announced in Lagos today by the director of defense information, Brigadier General Fred Chijuka. Members of the council are to be sworn in tomorrow at Dodan Barracks. Brig. Gen. Chijuka said in addition to the title of head of state,

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